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FOURTH AMENDMENT-OF CARS,
CONTAINERS AND CONFUSION
,California v. Robbins, 101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981).
New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981).
I. PRELUDE
"[I]n [analyzing fourth amendment issues] we do not write on a
clean slate."' Last term, the Supreme Court reviewed the slate upon
which it had written the automobile exception, 2 the search incident to
I Chadwick v. Sanders, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977).
2 The automobile exception, an exception to the warrant requirement, justifies the war-
rantless search of an automobile when an officer has probable cause to believe that an auto-
mobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime and an exigent circumstance exists. An
exigency exists when the automobile is stopped on the roadway, the occupants have reason to
believe they are under suspicion, and any evidence could disappear prior to obtaining a war-
rant. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925). See aLro C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDUR E 141-52 (1980); Moylan, The Automo-
bile Excetiona What It Is and What It Is Not-A Rationale in Search ofa Clearer Label, 27 MERCER
L. REV. 987, 1060 (1976); Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 835 (1974) (hereinafter cited as Warrantless Searches). For a discussion of Caroll, Chambers
and the automobile exception, see notes 95-109 & accompaning text infa.
One commentator has argued that the requirements of the automobile exception are
clear. Confusion arises when cases involving automobiles are treated as if they are within the
exception irrespective of whether they meet the requirements of the exception. See Moylan,
supra, at 10 12-13. It does not follow a fortiori that because the police search an automobile or
an automobile is at the scene of a search that the automobile exception applies. See Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
The Court has not included the warrantless search within the automobile exception if
the officer did not have probable cause to search, Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S.
266, 269-70 (1973), or the situation did not present an exigent circumstance, Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 459-62.
LaFave postulated that the automobile exception allows the warrantless search if proba-
ble cause developed when there was an immediate need to search or seize the car. 2 W.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 514-15 (1980).
A number of cases have involved the search of an automobile, but not the automobile
exception: searches incident to an arrest, see, e.g., Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391
U.S. 216, 220-22 (1968); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367-68 (1964); inventory
searches, see, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369-76 (1976); Cady v. Dom-
browski, 413 U.S. 433, 446-48 (1973); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 235-36 (1968);
Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61-62 (1967); and searches of the exterior of an automobile,
see, e.g., Caldwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 588-92 (1974) (plurality opinion).
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arrest exception, 3 and the container case law4 in an attempt to bring
some consistency to the chaos of fourth amendment analysis. The Court
sought to clarify the scope of warrantless searches of containers found
within automobiles by announcing two bright line rules.
The plurality held in Robbins v. Caifornia5 that, as a general rule, an
officer cannot open without a warrant a closed opaque container which,
by its appearance, does not convey its contents. Applying this rule, the
Robbins Court invalidated the warrantless search of an opaquely
wrapped package found in the luggage compartment of a station wagon
during a valid automobile exception search.
The general rule announced by the majority in New York v. Belton6
established the right of an officer making a valid custodial arrest of an
automobile occupant to search the passenger compartment of the auto-
mobile and any containers found during the search. The Court upheld
the search of the contents of the pockets of Belton's jacket found on the
back seat of a lawfully stopped automobile in which Belton was riding
as incidental to Belton's arrest.
This Note analyzes the Robbins decision in light of the automobile
exception and the container cases. The decision expanded the warrant
requirement of the container cases and narrowed the scope of a warrant-
less search under the automobile exception. The plurality, in requiring
a warrant to search all closed, opaque containers, misapplied the reason-
ing of the container cases, and misread the rationale underlying the au-
tomobile exception. 7 The facts of Robbis placed the case within the
confines of the automobile exception, but the plurality ignored the ex-
ception, and looked instead to the container cases for guidance. Finally,
the plurality, in opting for a bright line rule, failed to consider the rea-
sonableness of Robbin's privacy expectation and of the warrantless
search.8
3 This Note uses interchangeably the phrases "arrest search exception", "search incident
exception", and "search incident to an arrest exception". In the last major Supreme Court
decision delineating the scope of the arrest search exception, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969), the Court narrowed the exception to allow only a search of the arrestee's person
and the area within the arrestee's immediate control. Id at 762-63. See C. WHrrEBREAD,
supra note 2, at 134-42.
4 See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1
(1977). These cases required a search warrant to search personal luggage. For a discussion of
Sanders and Chadwick, see notes 110-17 & accompanying text in/a.
5 101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981).
6 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981).
7 Much of the discussion of the Robbins analysis focuses on the proper inclusion of cases
within or exclusion of cases from the automobile exception. This Note argues that beginning
with dicta in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), the Court has misconstrued
the automobile exception which has led to its present narrow interpretation. See notes 90-145
& accompanying text in/fa.
8 See notes 146-78 & accompanying text in/a.
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The rule announced in Belton represented a further expansion of
the arrest search exception and rejected any application of the warrant
requirement of the container cases. Based upon the facts of Belton, the
warrantless search of the automobile and of Belton's jacket was reason-
able. The Court's analysis, however, did not support its extension of the
scope of the arrest search exception to include the passenger compart-
ment of an automobile whenever an occupant of the automobile is ar-
rested. Once the Court determined, however, that the area of the
warrantless search included the passenger compartment, case law sup-
ported further inclusion of containers found within the passenger com-
partment. Finally, the efficacy of the bright line rule, due to its factual
limitations, is questionable.9
Robbins and Belton will not advance the Court's goal of reducing the
confusion concerning fourth amendment requirements for automobile
and container searches.10 The decisions will enhance rather than dimin-
ish the confusion. The contrary philosophical positions taken by the
Court in the two cases and the questionable impact of each decision
perpetuates the confusion. The philosophical direction of the Court is
unclear because it analyzed similar fact settings" and reached contrary
decisions as to the appropriateness of each warrantless search. It struck
down a warrantless search based on probable cause in Robbins and up-
held a warrantless search without probable cause in Belton. The deci-
sions probably will have little precedential value in future fourth
amendment cases. A majority of the Court could not agree on the
proper rule in Robbins, and the application of the rule announced by the
Court in Belton is limited. Finally, the Court left courts and law enforce-
ment officials without clear guidance about how to analyze fourth
amendment issues when it chose to abandon a factual case-by-case ap-
proach, and, instead, announced bright line rules. The Court did not
indicate when it would abandon the individual case approach for a cate-
gorical case approach in the future.
9 See notes 221-38 & accompanying text inJ/a.
10 See notes 242-49 & accompanying text infra.
11 Both Robbins and Belton involved the valid stop of an automobile by a state law enforce-
ment officer, the valid arrest of the occupant or occupants of the car, a valid warrantless
search of a particular area of the automobile, and the subsequent search of a container found
in the area of the automobile searched. See Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. at 2855 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). The Court was willing to decide the factually similar cases differently because
the states of California and New York argued different exceptions in support of the searches.
See id at 2847 ("[T]he respondent does not allege the presence of any circumstances that
would constitute a valid exception. . . ."). The exceptions cited by the court were the search
incident exception and a consent search. Id at 2847 n.3. Compare id at 2848 n.2 (Powell, J.,
concurring). Justice Powell maintained that different decisions were necessary because of the
different circumstances of each case, yet he found only one significant factual difference-the
search extended to the trunk area in Robbins.
1981] 1173
1174 SUPREME COURT REVIEW [Vol. 72
II. ROBBINS V. CALIFORNIA
Jeffrey R. Robbins was driving his station wagon in the early morn-
ing 12 when the Californa Highway Patrol stopped him for driving errat-
ically. 13 After asking to see his driver's license 14 and car registration, 15
one officer noted that Robbins was speaking rapidly' 6 and that he had
trouble removing his driver's license from his wallet. Following Robbins
to his station wagon for the registration papers, the officer believed that
he smelled "marijuana smoke" when Robbins opened the door,' 7 and he
saw a pair of tweezers similar to those used to smoke marijuana lying on
the front seat of the car.18 The officer then searched Robbins and dis-
covered a vile of liquid.' 9 The second officer stood with Robbins while
the first officer searched the passenger compartment of the station
wagon, 20 where he found marijuana and assorted contraband parapher-
12 1:45 a.m., Petition for cert. at 2.
13 101 S. Ct. at 2843. Although there was some basis for questioning the propriety of the
stop, that issue was not before the Court. The patrolman stopped Robbins on a cold and
foggy winter morning. Visibility was a quarter of a mile. Petition for cert. at 2-3. The of-
ficers first noticed Robbins because they believed he was traveling too slowly for the speed
zone. The speed zone, however, was lower than the officers thought. At a distance of one-
quarter to one-half mile they saw Robbins cross the center line twice. Id at 3. The officers
then stopped Robbins pursuant to CAL. VEH. CODE § 2804 (West 1971).
A member of the California Highway Patrol upon reasonable belief that any vehicle is
being operated in violation of any provisions of this code or is in such unsafe condition as
to endanger any person, may require the driver of the vehicle to stop and submit to an
inspection of the vehicle, and its equipment, license plates, and registration card.
Based on the visibility and the officers' mistaken belief as to the speed zone, it is not clear that
they had a reasonable belief to stop Robbins' station wagon. Ste Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (It is unreasonable for an officer to randomly stop an automobile with-
out at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that the driver is unlicensed or the vehicle is
unregistered or either an occupant or the car is otherwise subject to seizure for violating the
law).
14 CAL. VEH. CODE § 12951 (West 1971).
(a) The licensee shall have the license issued to him in his immediate possession at
all times when driving a motor vehicle upon a highway.
(b) The driver of a motor vehicle shall present his license for examination upon
demand of a peace officer enforcing the provisions of this code.
15 CAL. VEH. CODE § 4454 (West 1971).
(a) Every owner upon receipt of a registration card shall maintain the same or a
facsimile copy thereof with the vehicle for which issued.
16 People v. Robbins, 103 Cal. App. 3d 34, 38, 162 Cal. Rptr. 780, 782 (1st Dist. 1980).
17 101 S. Ct. at 2844.
18 103 Cal. App. 3d at 38, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
19 The record did not disclose the contents of the vile.
20 A series of events occurred at this point which the Supreme Court did not relate. After
frisking Robbins, the officer entered the station wagon to seize the tweezers. 103 Cal. App. 3d
at 38, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 782. Shortly thereafter, Robbins spread eagled over the automobile
collapsed on to the roadway, and began to vomit. Id The officer exited the car momentarily,
then re-entered it and searched it thoroughly. Id
Robbins claimed that exhaust fumes from his car had overcome him, causing his sick-
ness. Petition for cert. at 4. He alleged implicitly that the officers forced his statement re-
1981] OF CARS, CONTAINERS, AND CONFUSION 1175
nalia.2' Robbins then volunteered, "[w]hat you are looking for is in the
back."'22 One officer placed Robbins in the patrol car while the other
opened the tailgate. The officer opened the luggage compartment,
opened a tote bag and "two packages wrapped in green opaque plastic"
within the compartment, 23 all of which contained marijuana.24
Robbins was charged 25 with various drug offenses under California
law.26 His motion to suppress the evidence found in the search of the
packages in the luggage compartment was denied,27 and Robbins was
convicted. The California Court of Appeals upheld the conviction.28
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and re-
manded the case for further consideration in light of its decision in Ar-
kansas v. 5anders.29 On remand, the California Court of Appeals30
reaffirmed Robbins' conviction, finding that the search of the green
packages was within one of the exceptions justifying a warrantless search
garding additional contraband by causing him to breathe exhaust fumes, and then by forcing
him to remain in the cold after getting sick. Id
21 101 S. Ct. at 2844. The items seized included "a pair of tweezers holding a burned
hand-rolled cigarette butt, an alligator clip, a hand-rolled cigarette, and a cookie tin which
contained marijuana seeds, two packs of cigarette papers, and a plastic baggie containing
marijuana." 103 Cal. App. 3d at 38,,162 Cal. Rptr. at 782 (The court took the facts from the
hearing on the motion to suppress.).
The Attorney General of California conceded that Arkansas v. Sanders required the officer
to obtain a warrant before opening the cookie tin. Id. at 39, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
22 101 S. Ct. at 2854 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting). Se note 20 supra.
23 101 S. Ct. at 2844 (plurality opinion).
24 103 Cal. App. 3d at 38, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 782. The Attorney General of California
agreed that opening the tote bag required a warrant after Sanders. Id at 39, 162 Cal. Rptr. at
782.
Each green plastic bag contained fifteen pounds of marijuana. 101 S. Ct. at 2844. An
inspector for the Solano County Drug Abuse Bureau estimated the street value of the confis-
cated marijuana to be $8000. The amount seized would supply an individual user for seven-
teen years. Petition against cert. at 6-7.
25 The exact point at which the officers placed Robbins under arrest is not clear from the
record. The Court's rendition does not even mention his arrest. It appears that he was ini-
tially arrested for driving under the influence of marijuana. See Petition for cert. at 3. The
exact time of the arrest or even the fact of an arrest is not relevant under the automobile
exception. See Moylan, supra note 2, at 1013.
26 Robbins was charged and convicted for violating CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 11357 (West Supp. 1981) (unauthorized possession of marijuana); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 11359 (West Supp. 1981) (unauthorized possession of marijuana for sale); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFrTY CODE § 11360 (West Supp. 1981) (transportation of marijuana).
The appellate court stayed the sentences under §§ 11357 and 11359 because the former
was based on inadmissible evidence and the latter was included within § 11360. 103 Cal.
App. 3d at 42, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 784-85.
27 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5 (West Supp. 1981). The section allows a defendant to
move to suppress evidence or for the return of property obtained during an unreasonable
warrantless search or seizure.
28 Unpublished opinion.
29 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
30 103 Cal. App. 3d 34, 162 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1st Dist. 1980).
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of a container recognized by the Court in Sanders .3 The court held that
Robbins did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the green
plastic packages because the trial court could have reasonably deter-
mined that the officers inferred from the appearance of the packages
that they contained marijuana. 32 The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari and reversed the decision of the California court.33
31 Id at 39-40, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 783. For a discussion of the exceptions recognized by
Sanders, see note 148 & accompanying text infra.
32 Before analyzing the search under Sanders, the court, per Judge Christain, found the
stop of the automobile as well as the subsequent search of its interior to be lawful based on the
officers' belief that Robbins had been smoking marijuana. People v. Robbins, 103 Cal. App.
3d at 38-39, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 782 (citing People v. Boddie, 274 Cal. App. 2d 408, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 83 (1969).
Robbins argued based upon Remers v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 659, 470 P.2d 11, 87
Cal. Rptr. 202 (1970) (warrantless search of a tinfoil package invalidated because tinfoil is
commonly used to wrap lawful items as well as drugs), that any number of lawful items could
have been wrapped like the marijuana bricks. The court rejected Robbins' argument and
contended that although the packages could have contained a number of lawful items, "[a]ny
experienced observer could have inferred [that] a bulky, fifteen pound, brick-shaped, plastic-
wrapped package suggested that it contain[ed] a specific type of contraband (a brick of mari-
juana)." 103 Cal. App. 3d 40, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 783.
The dissent argued that Sanders brought most closed containers within the protection of
the fourth amendment warrant requirement. Id at 43, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 785 (Rattigan, J.,
dissenting). The dissent accepted Robbins' argument and pointed out that the packages
could have contained a number of lawful items such as "books, stationary, canned goods, or
any number of other wholly innocuous items. . . ." Id The dissent concluded, therefore,
that the packages did not fall within the exceptions recognized by Sanders. Id at 44, 162 Cal.
Rptr. at 785 (Rattigan, J., dissenting).
33 The Court granted certiorari to resolve the "continuing uncertainty" of the reasonable-
ness of warrantless searches of closed containers. 101 S. Ct. at 2844.
The container cases had generated considerable uncertainty. The Court granted certio-
rari in Sanders to clear up the misunderstanding concerning Chadwick. Arkansas v. Sanders,
442 U.S. 753, 754 (1979). In his dissent in Sanders Justice Blackmun argued that Sanders
would only add to the confusion of the permissibility of warrantless searches of containers. In
premonitory fashion, Justice Blackmun wrote: "Still hanging in limbo, and probably soon to
be litigated, are the briefcase, the wallet, the package, the paper bag, and every other kind of
container." Id at 768. Robbins is the realization of Blackmun's premonition.
The confusion generated by Chadwick and Sanders is not surprising since, prior to Chad-
wick, the lower courts applied the automobile exception to searches of containers. See Moy-
Ian, supra note 2, at 1054. See, e.g., United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 1976)
(only challenged search of car, and not the search of a paper bag within the car); United
States v. Canada, 527 F.2d 1374, 1379-80 (9th Circuit 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 867 (1976)
(personal belongings bag); United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1100 (2d Cir. 1975)
(suitcase); United States v. Anderson, 500 F.2d 1311, 1315 (5th Cir. 1974) (boxes); United
States v. Soriano, 497 F.2d 147, 149 (5th Cir. 1974) (suitcase); United States v. Bowman, 487
F.2d 1129, 1131 (10th Cir. 1973) (no challenge of search of footlocker or suitcase found in car;
challenged the search of the car); United States v. Evans, 481 F.2d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 1973)
(footlocker); United States v. Garner, 451 F.2d 167, 169 (6th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (brief-
cases).
This practice continued even after the Chadwick decision. See, e.g., United States v.
Milhoun, 599 F.2d 518, 527 (3d Cir. 1979) (satchel); United States v. Neuman, 585 F.2d 355,
360-61 (8th Cir. 1978) (cardboard box); United States v. Gaultney, 581 F.2d 1137, 1143-44
(5th Cir. 1978) (box); United States v. Finnegan, 568 F.2d 637, 640-41 (9th Cir. 1977) (suit-
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The Court in Robbins squarely faced the issue of whether the auto-
mobile exception to the warrant requirement or the warrant require-
ment of the container cases controlled the search of a container
discovered during the valid warrantless search of an automobile. 34 A
plurality35 refused to extend the automobile exception to closed contain-
ers found within an automobile; instead, they required the officer to ob-
tain a warrant before opening the container. Justice Powell concurred 36
only in the result because he disagreed with the majority's bright line
rule. A bright line rule did not trouble the Justices who dissented. 37
They believed, however, that such a rule should allow the search of any-
thing discovered during an automobile exception search.38
Justice Stewart, writing for the plurality, rejected the two argu-
ments pressed on the Court to justify the warrantless opening of the
packages. After invoking the usual fourth amendment presumptions
and niceties, 39 he immediately turned to United States v. Chadwick40 and
Arkansas v. Sanders4' to support his decision not to accept the first argu-
ment, which urged the Court to expand the automobile exception to the
warrantless opening of closed containers found within an automobile.4 2
The plurality pointed out that in Chadwick43 and in Sanders,4 the federal
government and the state of Arkansas, respectively, had urged the Court
case); but see United States v. Stevie, 582 F.2d 1175, 1178 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 443 U.S.
911 (1979) (officers could seize suitcases from stopped automobile, but could not search them
without a warrant).
34 Other potential threshold questions were not at issue. State law apparently justified the
initial stop of the car. The automobile exception validated the search of the car and the
seizure of the packages.
35 The plurality consisted of Justices Stewart, Brennan, White, and Marshall.
36 Chief Justice Burger concurred in the result, but failed to write an opinion expressing
his disagreement with the analysis. It is odd that the Chief Justice would fail to express his
disagreement with the reasoning of the plurality or provide his analysis on an issue within
such a volatile area of the law. The Chief Justice's failure to express himself is one of the
questions surrounding the subsequent application of Robbins.
37 Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stevens all dissented in separate opinions.
38 Justice Stevens was not willing to go as far as Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist. Ste-
vens would, however, allow the warrantless search of containers that could reasonably contain
contraband. 101 S. Ct. of 2855 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
39 Justice Stewart set out the fundamental fourth amendment trilogy. First, the fourth
amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Next, courts presume that a
search is per se unreasonable if the officer has not obtained a warrant based on probable
cause from a neutral magistrate. Finally, a few well-defined exceptions overcome the pre-
sumption that a warrantless search is unreasonable. Id at 2844.
40 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977).
41 442 U.S. 753, 763-65.
42 The United States government, as amicus curiae, urged the Court to extend the auto-
mobile exception to include containers found during an automobile exception search. 101 S.
Ct. at 2845.
43 The government did not argue in Chadwick that luggage was within the automobile
exception, but only that luggage was analogous to vehicles due to their mobile nature. It
asserted that since officers could reasonably search an automobile without a warrant due to
1981] 1177
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to extend the automobile exception to validate the wrarantless search of
containers taken from automobiles in those cases. The Court refused to
do so in each case. In Chadwick, the Court found that since luggage was
more easily seized and controlled,45 and had a greater expectation of
privacy than did an automobile,4 luggage required a warrant before an
officer could search it. The majority in Sanders applied the same analysis
to a suitcase.4 7 Justice Stewart adopted this rationale without further
analysis to reject the extension argument.48
The Court then turned to the second argument: the fourth amend-
its mobility, officers should also be able to search luggage without a warrant. United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11-13.
The government also contended, based on the abuse of the general writs of assistance,
that the warrant clause was meant only to protect "interests traditionally identified with the
home." Id at 6 (footnote omitted). See note 78 infra for a discussion of the history of the
fourth amendment.
Although historians support the government's interpretation of the purpose of the war-
rant clause of the fourth amendment, see general4y T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITU-
TIONAL INTERPRETATION (1969), the Court was quick to point to precedent that had applied
the warrant clause to privacy infringements found outside "the four walls of the home."
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11 (footnote omitted). The Court cited the following
cases to support their rejection of the government's argument: Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443 (1971) (warrantless search of automobile in driveway not allowed because no
exigent circumstance existed); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (held inadmissible
evidence obtained by a warrantless electronic monitoring of phone booth conversations);
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) (search of automobile within police custody not
upheld under arrest search exception); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (warrant
required for search of a hotel room).
44 442 U.S. at 761.
45 The majority in Chadwick maintained that once the officers had seized the footlocker
and transported it to their headquarters, there was no risk involved in waiting for a warrant
before searching the footlocker. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13. The Court noted
that it was easier to store an item like a footlocker than to store an automobile while waiting
for a warrant. Id at 13 n.7.
46 The Court contended that, whereas automobiles were merely used for transporation,
suitcases were repositories of personal effects; that whereas automobiles traveled the public
thoroughfares in plain view, the contents of suitcases were hidden from public view; and that
whereas automobiles were subject to pervasive regulation, suitcases were not regulated. Id at
12-13.
47 The Court in Sanders reiterated the analysis used in Chadwick. It noted that the auto-
mobile exception justified stopping the cab and seizing the suitcase from the trunk, id at 761,
but that the exception did not extend to the search of the suitcase, id at 763. The Court
maintained that the state had failed to show an exigency justifying the immediate search
without a warrant. Id at 763. Justice Powell concluded that since the expected privacy in a
suitcase was not diminished by placing it in an automobile, and since suitcases are repositories
of personal effects, the reasons for allowing the warrantless search of an automobile did not
apply to a suitcase: "We therefore find no justification for the extension of Carroll and its
progeny to the warrantless search of one's personal luggage merely because it was located in
an automobile lawfully stopped by the police." Id at 764-65 (footnote omitted).
48 'Those cases made clear, if it was not clear before, that a closed piece of luggage found
in a lawfully searched car is constitutionally protected to the same extent as are closed pieces
of luggage found anywhere else." 101 S. Ct. at 2845.
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ment does not protect all containers,49 but protects only those which are
commonly used to transport personal effects.50 Justice Stewart first re-
jected a personal-impersonal dichotomy because it lacked a basis in the
fourth amendment. 5' He stated that objects are protected not because
they are personal, but because of the expectation of privacy manifested
by putting them in closed opaque containers.5 2 Second, he maintained
49 The State of California argued that different expectations of privacy existed in different
containers. 101 S. Ct. at 2845.
The State proposed a reasonableness test for determining which containers were pro-
tected by the warrant requirement.
If a reasonable person, in light of all the circumstances, has cause to believe that the
container in question is a repository of personal effects, than a warrantless search is pro-
hibited. If, however, there is no reason to believe that the container is a receptacle for
such articles, then probable cause alone is sufficient to justify the search. In evaluating
all of the circumstances, the searching police officer may consider the intended purpose
of the container, its present use, how it is secured or sealed, how it is stored, its outside
markings, its weight and consistency, and any odor it may emit.
Brief for Respondent, Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981), at 51-52. The State
maintained that the rule proposed flowed from Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
Chadwick, Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (standing requirements to challenge validity
of a search), and Sanders. The state argued that the rule it proposed was an outgrowth of the
exception in Sanders that a warrant is not required to search a container if the officer can infer
the container's contents from its appearance. Brief for Respondent, Robbins v. California,
101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981), at 57-58.
The State had abundant support for its position that all containers are not equal in the
eyes of the fourth amendment. Se United States v. Benson, 631 F.2d 1336, 1338 (8th Cir.
1980) (warrant needed to search luggage); United States v. Rigales, 630 F.2d 364, 368 (5th
Cir. 1980) (warrant needed to search leather pouch); United States v. McKay, 606 F.2d 264,
265 (9th Cir. 1979) (warrant needed to search a suitcase); United States v. Meier, 602 F.2d
253, 255 (10th Cir. 1979) (warrant needed to search backpack). Compare United States v.
Mannino, 635 F.2d 110, 114 (23d Cir. 1980) (upheld warrantless search of a box); United
States v. Goshorn, 628 F.2d 697, 700 (Ist Cir. 1980) (upheld warrantless search of paper and
plastic bag); United Sates v. Mackey, 626 F.2d 684, 686 (9th Cir. 1980) (upheld warrantless
search of brown paper bag).
The Supreme Court's development of an alernative rationale for the automobile excep-
tion bolsters the State's argument for the sliding expectation level. The Court has recognized
"significant differences" between vehicles and dwellings, and on that basis has permitted war-
rantless searches of automobiles in circumstances that would not justify the warrantless search
of a dwelling. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12; Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 153. Throughout the past decade the Court has maintained in dictum that the
difference in warrant needs between automobiles and houses was due to the lesser expectation
of privacy in the former. See notes 110-34 & accompanying text inf0a.
50 By personal effects the [State] means property worn on or carried about the person or
having some intimate relation to the person." 101 S. Ct. at 2845.
51 The fourth amendment protects people and their effects whether they are personal or
impersonal. Id at 2846. Almost fifteen years earlier, the Court pointed out that "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351.
52 Once placed within a closed, opaque container, "a diary and a dishpan are equally
protected by the fourth amendment." 101 S. Ct. at 2846. If there is no difference in the
consideration of a container holding a diary and one holding a dishpan, then the Court
should not have relied on personal effects as a factor in distinguishing between automobiles
and luggage. See note 46 sufra.
1180 SUPREME COURT REVIEW [Vol. 72
that a personal-impersonal distinction was patently unworkable. 53 Fi-
nally, although he recognized the plain view exceptions of Sanders,54 Jus-
tice Stewart ruled that the state had not proven that the two green
plastic packages fell within the exceptions. 55 The plurality concluded
that the automobile exception did not justify the warrantless search of
53 "[A]s the disparate results in the decided cases indicate, no court, no constable, no
citizen can sensibly be asked to distinguish the relative 'privacy interests' in a closed suitcase,
briefcase, portfolio, duffle bag, or box." 101 S. Ct. at 2846.
The Court cited United States v. Ross, No. 79-1624 (D.C. Cir. March 31, 1981). The
Circuit court held, en banc, that the police could not search without a warrant a brown paper
bag removed from the trunk of a parked car unless one of two circumstances existed. Either
the officers had to reasonably believe that the bag's contents posed a danger to them if not
opened immediately, or a risk of losing the evidence had to exist if the officers obtained a
warrant first. Id at 18. The court rejected a 'worthy container' rule. Id at 3, 21. The court
did uphold the initial stop of the automobile and the seizure of the package, based upon the
informant's tip, under the automobile exception. Id at 19-20.
The State of California argued that there was a workable way to distinguish between
containers holding personal items and those holding impersonal items. See note 45 supra. The
State pointed out that the test proposed would not allow warrantless searches of briefcases or
suitcases. Brief for Respondent, Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981), at 52. The en
banc court in Ross maintained that one person's brown bag is another's suitcase. The respon-
dent dealt with this social strata argument when it discussed the search of Robbins' two green
garbage bags. The officers would have had to obtain a warrant to open the bags if from
handling them they believed that the contents of the bags had the consistency and weight of
clothing. If, however, the bags had the consistency and weight of marijuana and the packages
smelled of marijuana, then the officers could search the packages "because there is probable
cause to believe the packages contain contraband." Brief for Respondent, Robbins v. Califor-
nia, 101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981), at 53.
54 The Sanders Court acknowledged exceptions to its holding that a warrant was required
to search luggage irrespective of where it was seized. The exceptions delineated by the Court
centered around the plain view exception to the warrant requirement:
[S]ome containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature
cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be in-
ferred from their outward appearance. Similarly, in some cases the contents of a package
will be open to 'plain view,' thereby obviating the need for a warrant.
442 U.S. at 764-65 n. 13. "IT]he negative implication of footnote 13 of the Sanders opinion is
that, unless the container is such that its contents may be said to be in plain view, those
contents are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment." 101 S. Ct. at 2846.
55 Justice Stewart maintained that the testimony of the officer--that he had heard that
marijuana was packaged in green, plastic bags-was not sufficient to bring the packages
within the Sander's exception:
This vague testimony certainly did not establish that marijuana is ordinarily 'packaged
this way.' Expectations of privacy are established by general social norms, and to fall
within the second exception of the footnote in question [Sanders footnote thirteen] a
container must so clearly announce its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration,
its transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an observer.
Id at 2847.
The record was silent as to whether any inferences were drawn by the officer from han-
dling the packages or by smelling an odor emanating from the packages before he opened
them. The record did indicate, however, that after the trooper had discovered marijuana and
paraphernelia in the passenger compartment, Robbins told the troopers that what they were
looking for was in the back. 103 Cal. App. 3d at 38, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
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the packages. 56
In a separate concurrence,5 7 Justice Powell agreed with the plural-
ity that Robbins had manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the packages,58 but he refused to adopt the plurality's general rule that a
warrant is required in order to search all closed opaque containers.5 9
Justice Powell 60 preferred to limit the plurality's opinion. He asserted
56 The plurality held that a closed opaque container "may not be opened without a war-
rant, even if it is found during the course of a lawful search of an automobile." 101 S. Ct. at
2847. The plurality did note, however, that the officers could have opened the containers
pursuant to either an arrest search or a consent search exception to the warrant requirement.
Id at 2847, n.3.
57 Before discussing Robbins, Justice Powell made two preliminary points. First he noted
the general confusion surrounding the reasonableness of automobile exceptions. He attrib-
uted the confusion to two factors: "the necessity of applying the general command of the
Fourth Amendment to ever-varying facts;" and to the "often unpalatable consequences of the
exclusionary rule, which spur the Court to reduce its analysis to simple mechanical rules so
that the constable has a fighting chance not to blunder." 101 S. Ct. at 2848 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
Next Justice Powell outlined the three issues presented by Robbins and Belton collectively:
(A) the scope of the search incident to arrest on the public highway; (B) whether officers
must obtain a warrant when they have probable cause to search a particular container in
which the suspect has a reasonable expectation of privacy; and (C) the scope of the
'automobile exception' to the warrant requirement, which potentially includes all areas
of the car and containers found therein.
Id at 2848 (Powell, J., concurring). He further pointed out the importance of delineating
between the issues and discussing them separately to avoid confusion. Id at 2848.
Similarly, a commentator has warned of intertwining the automobile exception of Carroll
and the search incident to an arrest exception of Chimel:
All too frequently, however, search incident criteria and Carroll Doctrine [automobile
exception] criteria are intertwined in one analytically inextricable mess. A sound rule of
thumb for the common law reader would be to take any opinion in which reference to
both Carroll and Chimel is made in a single paragraph, let alone in a single sentence, and
to consign that opinion politely but expeditiously to the nearest trashcan.
Moylan, supra note 2, at 1013. For a good example of a decision which keeps the analysis
separate, see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443. The Court analyzed in distinct sec-
tions of the opinion the validity of the search of Coolidge's automobile under the automobile
exception, id at 458-64, the search incident to an arrest exception, id at 455-57, and the plain
view exception, id at 464-73.
58 Justice Powell contended that Sanders justified the result but did not compel it. 101 S.
Ct. at 2847 (Powell, J., concurring). He concurred in the judgment "because the manner in
which the package at issue was carefully wrapped and sealed evidenced petitioner's expecta-
tion of privacy in its contents." Id
59 Justice Powell gave several reasons for not adopting the plurality's bright line rule. Not
only did the rule go beyond any precedent, including Sanders, but it also failed to address the
nature of the container and whether one could reasonably have an expectation of privacy in
the container. "The plurality's 'bright-line' rule would extend the warrant clause of the
Fourth Amendment to every 'closed, opaque container,' without regard to size, shape or
whether common experience would suggest that the owner was asserting a privacy interest in
the contents." Id at 2847 n.l. Finally, the plurality's rule failed to weigh the societal and
individual interests. Justice Powell asserted that the decision, "impose[d] substantial burdens
on law enforcement without vindicating any significant values of privacy." Id at 2847.
60 Justice Powell began his discussion by explaining his support for the bright line rule
announced in Belton. After limiting the rationale of Belon to the search incident to arrest
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that the plurality had analyzed Robbins strictly as a container case, and
had not decided whether a warrant was necessary if a contemporaneous
arrest had occurred or if the officers had had probable cause to search
the automobile carrying the container. 61 He argued that Chadwick and
Sanders mandated a reasonableness approach 62 in deciding when a war-
rant was required to search a container. 63 Certainly, he concluded,
neither case supported the "mechanical" approach of the plurality,64
which would not better protect the privacy interests of citizens nor aid
the efforts of law enforcement personnel.65
exception, he balanced the individual's "limited expectation of privacy in the interior of the
automobile" that existed after a custodial arrest with the government's interest in protecting
the officer and any evidence present. He concluded that "in the violatile and fluid situation
of an encounter between an arresting officer and a suspect apprehended on the public high-
way" that it was reasonable and necessary to "allow an officer. . . to secure thoroughly the
automobile without requiring him in haste and under pressure to make close calculations
about danger to himself or the vulnerability of evidence. Id at 2848.
61 "[T]he plurality's opinion in this case concerns itself primarily with the kinds of con-
tainers requiring a warrant for their search when police have probable cause to search them,
and where there has been no arrest." Id at 2849. He viewed the case solely as a container
case and not as an automobile exception case. Id In other words, the probable cause focused
on the container rather than the automobile.
This approach misreads the facts. Unlike Chadwick or Sanders, the troopers in Robbins did
not have probable cause to believe prior to stopping the automobile that a package within the
automobile contained contraband. Probable cause to search the automobile arose prior to
probable cause to search the packages. The Court's decision to uphold the seizure of the
packages supports this inference. Id at 2847 (plurality opinion). See notes 144-45 & accom-
panying text infra.
62 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 152 (Powell, J., concurring) ("The ultimate question
• ..is whether one's claim to privacy from government intrusion is reasonable in light of all
the surrounding circumstances.").
63 Chadwick only required a warrant to search sealed containers that generally hold per-
sonal items. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11. Sanders only required a warrant to
search containers that are repositories of personal effects. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at
764-65.
64 The majority in Sanders explained that they held only that personal luggage required a
warrant to validate its search. The majority also mentioned other containers and noted that
officers and the courts would find it difficult at times to determine which containers required
a warrant. 442 U.S at 764 n.13. This implicitly left the door open to continued warrantless
searches of closed containers.
At least one commentator has interpreted the language of footnote thirteen to indicate
that the list of exceptions provided by the Sanders Court were not meant to be exhaustive. 2
W. LAFAVE, supra note 2, at 76-77 (Supp. 1981).
For circuit court cases allowing the warrantless search of closed, opaque containers after
Sanders, see note 49 supra. For two of the most recent cases allowing the warrantless search of
closed, opaque containers see, e.g, United States v. Stewart, 650 F.2d 178, 181 (9th Cir. 1981)
(briefcase); United States v. Kreimes, 649 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1981) (the possibility of a
fugitive at large provided an exigency to search a briefcase).
65 Justice Powell's thesis is that an increased burden on a societal interest, manifested by
requiring officers to spend more time and effort seeking warrants rather than performing their
normal duties, is justified only when offset by an increase in the protection afforded individ-
ual rights. Here, requiring an officer to obtain a warrant to search a "cigar box or a Dixie
cup" discovered during a valid automobile exception search would increase the burden on
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Finally, Justice Powell considered the scope of the automobile ex-
ception. He maintained that extending the scope of the exception to the
situation at bar, as advocated by the dissenters, was consistent with
Chadwick and Sanders since neither case involved the automobile excep-
tion.66 Furthermore, he favored the idea of extending the exception be-
cause this option presented an opportunity for a majority of the Court to
establish specific guidelines for the police and the courts to follow. 6 7 He
noted one drawback: the bright line rule might shift the focus of litiga-
tion to other questions, such as when probable cause ripened and
whether the suspicion focused on the container or the automobile, and
thereby lost some of its effectiveness. 68 Because he was able to dis-
society without "the advancement of important Fourth Amendment values." 101 S. Ct. at
2849 (Powell, J., concurring).
Justice Powell argued that the plurality had overstated the difficulty in determining a
reasonable expectation of privacy. He argued that a warrant clearly was required to search
personal luggage, whereas a warrantless search of a plastic cup or brown paper sack was
reasonable. He urged courts to hold hearings to determine the level of expectation mani-
fested by the defendant in items that fell between the two extremes. Id at 2850 n.3.
Relevant to such an inquiry should be the size, shape, material, and condition of the
exterior, the context within which it is discovered, and whether the possessor had taken
some significant precaution, such as locking, securely sealing or binding the container,
that indicates a desire to prevent the contents from being displayed upon simple
mischance.
Id
66 Id at 2850. He perceived the dissenters' position to be that a warrantless search of a
container was valid when the probable cause focused on the automobile and not a particular
container. He believed that this position, which distinguished the need for a warrant based
on the foci of the probable cause, was reconcilable with Chadwick and Sanders. The probable
cause in Chadwick and danders focused on the footlocker and the suitcase, respectively, and not
the automobiles. Id Ste notes 139-40 & accompanying text infra.
Justice Powell did note without elaboration, however, that acceptance of the position of
the dissenters would require the rejection of much of the reasoning in Sanders. 101 S. Ct. at
2850.
67 Id. at 2850 (Powell, J., concurring).
68 Justice Powell's question as to the ripening of probable cause is not unique to the plu-
rality's bright line rule. The defendant can challenge the existence of probable cause when-
ever probable cause is required to justify a fourth amendment search. Even when a warrant
is obtained, the sufficiency of its basis may later be challenged. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S.
155 (1978).
The fourth amendment does not require probable cause for governmental intrusions that
do not reach the level of a search, seizure, or an arrest. The Court usually requires reasonable
suspicion to support the lesser intrusions. See Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980) (per
curiam); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47
(1979); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873 (1975); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Com-
pare Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979) (probable cause required for custo-
dial interrogation seizure); United State v. Martinez-Fuentes, 428 U.S. 543, 560-62 (1976) (no
level of individualized suspicion required for stops at border checkpoints). Also, probable
cause is not required for a search incident to an arrest. See Belton v. New York, 101 S. Ct.
2860 (1981); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S.
260 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
Chadwick raised by implication the second issue, the focus of the probable cause. By
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tinguish Robbins from the automobile exception and because it was late
in the term, Justice Powell chose not to side with the dissenters. 69
Justice Blackmun dissented based upon his opinions in Chadwick70
and Sanders.71 The only merit he found in the plurality's opinion was
clarity.72 He, too, felt that the bright line rule would shift the focus of
the inquiry. He thought future litigation would focus on whether a
package's appearance bespoke its contents. 73 He did opt for a bright
line rule, which would extend the warrantless search of the automobile
exception to include personal property found within an automobile. 74
Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, levelled a general attack on fourth
amendment jurisprudence, 75 reciting themes familiar in his opinions.
He challenged the propriety of applying the exclusionary rule to the
precluding the warrantless search of any closed opaque container, Robbins eliminated this
concern. The magnitude ofJustice Powell's concern is questionable. The distinction as to the
development of probable cause between Robbinr on the one hand, and Chadwick and Sanders
on the other, is clear. See notes 144-45 & accompanying text infra.
69 Some future case affording an opportunity for more thorough consideration of the basic
principles at risk may offer some better, if more radical, solution to the confusion that infects
this benighted area of the law." 101 S. Ct. at 2851 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
70 Id at 2851 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 17
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Blackmun in Chadwick did not view Chadwick as an automobile
exception case. Rather, he proposed that "a warrant is not required to seize and search any
movable property in the possession of a person properly arrested in a public place." Id at 19.
He maintained that the automobile exception would have applied if the agents had waited
for the car to drive off and then pulled it over. Id at 22-23.
Based on a three-pronged argument he maintained that a warrant was not required to
search the footlocker even after the DEA agents had taken it to the federal building. First, it
was unreasonable for the officers to leave the property on the street or to post a guard over it
while they obtained a warrant. Second, the Court had previously allowed warrantless
searches even when the officers could have obtained a warrant. Se Caldwell v. Lewis, 417
U.S 583, 591-92 (1974) (plurality opinion) (reasonable to obtain evidence from the exterior of
an automobile without a warrant); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 804-05 (1974)
(reasonable for the police to provide arrestee with new clothes the morning after his arrest
and use the clothes he was arrested in as evidence). Third, requiring the officer to obtain a
warrant would not increase fourth amendment protections since a warrant would be forth-
coming in most instances. Id at 19-20.
71 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 768 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He argued that lug-
gage, like an automobile, was mobile and the expectation of privacy was not significantly
different; therefore, officers could search luggage found within an automobile without a war-
rant. Id at 769.
72 The rule "should serve to eliminate the opaqueness and to dissipate some of the confu-
sion." 101 S. Ct. at 2851 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
73 The lower court's opinion in Robbins suggests that the potential exists for a shift in issues
to whether the officers could have reasonably inferred the contents of a package from its
appearance. 103 Cal. App. 3d at 40, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 783 ("Any experienced observer could
have inferred from the appearance of the packages that they contained bricks of mari-
juana."); Id at 44, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 785 (Rattigan, J., dissenting) ("[Ilt could contain books,
stationary, canned goods, or any number of other wholly innocuous items which might be
heavy in weight.").
74 101 S. Ct. at 2851 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
75 Id at 2851 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He accused Justice Stewart of "engrafting sub-
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states,76 and criticized the pre-eminence of the warrant requirement 77 as
unjustified by the language or history of the fourth amendment. 78 He
tleties into the jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment itself that are neither required nor
desirable under our previous decisions."
Justice Rehnquist did not identify the subtleties of which he complained. Since Justice
Stewart did not introduce any fine distinctions in Robbins, Justice Rehnquist's concern must
stem from the fact that Justice Stewart wrote two contrary opinions based on similar factual
settings.
76 The "'exclusionary rule' . imposes a burden out of all proportion to the Fourth
Amendment values which it seeks to advance by seriously impeding the efforts of the na-
tional, state, and local governments to apprehend and convict those who have violated their
laws." Id at 2851 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist harkened back to Justice Harlan's concurring opinions in Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 490, in which Justice Harlan urged that the Court overrule
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961) (which had closed "the only courtroom door
remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness. . .," in extending application of
the exclusionary rule to evidence procured by state and local officials), and Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23, 33-34 (1963) (extending the reasonableness standard to state searches and
seizures). Justice Harlan believed that only then could the quite "intolerable" state of uncer-
,tainty surrounding fourth amendment requirements be solved. Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. at 490-9hi-
77 He challenged the substance of the requirement on two grounds: that magistrates did
not need legal training and that the sufficiency of the basis of the warrant could be challenged
at trial. 101 S. Ct. at 2852.
In Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972), the Court held that the clerks of the
Tampa Bay Municipal Court were neutral and detached magistrates for the purpose of the
fourth amendment. Id on 345-46. The clerks were only authorized to issue arrest warrants
for violations of city ordinances. Id at 347. The Court pointed out, though, that irrespective
of the court system, it had never held that only lawyers or judges could issue warrants. Id at
348.
The Court in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), recognized the right of a defend-
ant to challenge the truthfulness of statements made in an affidavit used to obtain a warrant.
Id at 155-56.
The Justice's challenge to the warrant requirement based on Shadwick and Franks is un-
sound. Shadwick did not break new ground. As the Court there pointed out, non-lawyers and
non-judges had been used in the federal system as magistrates, 407 U.S. at 349. Moreover,
the decision reached in Franks is consistent with the protection the warrant clause was
designed to provide. The fourth amendment requires probable cause to obtain a warrant.
This restriction would lose its meaning if the officer seeking the warrant did not have to stick
to the facts known and inferences reasonably drawn. See Franks v. Delaware, 430 U.S. at 168.
78 "[N]othing in the Fourth Amendment itself requires that searches be conducted pursu-
ant to warrants." 101 S. Ct. at 2852 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Although the fourth amendment provides no indication as to which clause controls-the
reasonableness clause or the warrant clause-the Court in this century began to favor the
warrant clause to ensure the reasonableness of a search or seizure. As federal jurisdiction over
criminal activity increased, the Court came to view the warrant as the safeguard of fourth
amendment rights. T. TAYLOR, supra note 43, at 45-46. See general N. LASSON, THE His-
TORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT To THE UNITED STATES CONSTI-
TUTION 106 (reprint 1970).
Justices Frankfurter and Jackson advocated the dominance of the warrant clause. Jus-
tice Jackson penned the passage that has become synonymous with the mandate of a warrant:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers,
is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable
men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be
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argued that these two principles, along with the Court's tendency to
decide cases solely with an urban police force in mind, unrealistically
ignored the problems and needs peculiar to each locality.79
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer en-
gaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. at 13-14 (footnote omitted). Justice Jackson emphasized
that the key to safeguarding fourth amendment rights was the involvement of the neutral
magistrate and not the level of evidence. Even if an officer had sufficient evidence to obtain a
warrant, he was not to search unless he first obtained the warrant. Any other conclusion
"would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in the
discretion of police officers." Id (footnote omitted). See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
at 180-81 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (uncontrolled search and seizure is the most effective
weapon of arbitrary governments). See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 356-57 (ap-
proval of search after the fact disallowed if a warrant was required).
The presumption in favor of the warranted search is now firmly embedded in our juris-
prudence. Except for a few recognized exceptions, a search conducted without obtaining a
warrant is "perse unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Id at 357 (footnote omitted).
See a/so Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 454-55. reasonableness is not a substitute for
a warrant. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 758.
One commentator has argued that deference to the warrant clause stands the fourth
amendment on its head. T. TAYLOR, supra note 43, at 23-24. According to Taylor, the found-
ing fathers intended the warrant clause to ensure against the re-emergence of the general writ
of assistance. Id at 35-44. See also C. PYLE, PRIVACY: CASES, MATERIALS AND QUESTIONS
3-16 to 3-18 (forthcoming). The writ had plagued the colonies prior to the revolution. A
general writ, which was a writ of unfixed term, allowed the holder (usually the crown's tax
agents) to search wherever he believed property was kept on which a custom or duty was
owed. For a discussion of the writ of assistance and the important cases of that era, see S.
PRESSER & J. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND AMERICAN HISTORY 61-90 (1980); C. PYLE, supra, at 3-
12 to 3-14. John Adams once declared that James Otis' denouncement of the writs "breathed
into this nation the breath of life." T. TAYLOR, supra note 43, at 27. See Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-25 (1886) (recalling the history of the writs of assistance). "The
"constitutional fathers were not concerned about warrantless searches, but about over-reach-
ing warrants. . . . Far from looking at the warrant as a protection against unreasonable
searches, they saw it as an authority for unreasonable and oppressive searches, and sought to
confine its issuance and execution . . ." Id at 41.
Justices in dissent still express the view that reasonableness is the controlling yardstick of
search and seizure validity. See Steagald v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 1654 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) ("Here as in all Fourth Amendment cases 'reasonableness is still the ultimate
standard'" (quoting Camara v. Muncipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967))).
79 101 S. Ct. at 2852 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He strenuously maintained that the ex-
clusionary rule, coupled with the presumption in favor of the warrant clause, had "substan-
tially frustrated" the efforts of law enforcement officers to arrest or gather evidence when they
had probable cause. He explained that the Court too often assumed that obtaining a warrant
only required the officer to "make a quick half mile ride to the nearest precinct station in an
urban area. . . ." Id
He argued that this urbanized view of law enforcement was unrealistic because in many
western and southern states the nearest magistrate is twenty-five to fifty miles away, rather
than merely one-half mile away. Id Examples of the difficulties faced by some local law
officials in obtaining warrants were presented to the Eighth Circuit in United States v.
Bozada, 473 F.2d 389 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 969 (1973).
* Arkansas: Chicot County. Sheriff Max Brown polices 642 square miles with the help of
two regular deputies. The highway patrol has two troopers assigned to the county.
There are four part-time justices of the peace and no circuit judges in Chicot County.
Two U.S. highways pass through the county.
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Justice Rehnquist then turned to a discussion of the Robbins case.
He rejected the plurality's interpretations of Cady v. Dombrowski80 and
South Dakota v. Opperman.8t To Justice Rehnquist, Cady and Opperman
demonstrate that the inherent mobility of automobiles as a class, and
not the mobility of a particular automobile, justifies the automobile ex-
ception.8 2 He agreed with Justice Blackmun that officers could search
" Iowa: Ringgold County: Sheriff E.T. Strange patrols 538 square miles with the help of
one deputy. The highway patrol has one trooper assigned to the county; there are
three part-time judges in Ringgold County. However the sheriff advises that occa-
sions arise in which they are out of town and it might be necessary to go to another
county to procure a search warrant.
" Minnesota" Lake of the Wood County: Sheriff Emmett Chilgren polices 1,311 square
miles without the help of a regular deputy. The highway patrol has a single trooper
assigned to the county. The county justice of the peace position was recently vacated,
although Lake of the Woods County shares a county judge with two other counties.
The county seat is Baudette, but the county judge may be holding court in Hallock,
in Kittson County, a round-trip of 264 miles from Baudette. . . . Sheriff Chilgren
stated to counsel that a search warrant could take as long as two days to obtain under
adverse circumstances.
" Mirsouni" Barry County: Sheriff Edwin Dummit polices 789 square miles with the help
of four deputies. The highway patrol has two troopers assigned to the county. There
is only one magistrate and one circuit judge in Barry County.
" Nebraska: Sioux County. Sheriff Tom Broderick patrols 2,063 square miles with the
help of one deputy. The highway patrol does not have a trooper regularly assigned to
the county. There is only one county judge in Sioux County.
* North Dakota: Sheridan County: Sheriff Leonard Hanson polices 989 square miles and
has no regular deputies. The highway patrol does not station a trooper there. A
single justice of the peace is the only judicial officer in Sheridan County ...
" South Dakota: Bufato County: Sheriff Francis E. Healey patrols 482 square miles with
the help of one county deputy. The highway patrol does not have any troopers regu-
larly assigned to the county. There are two part-time justices of the peace in Buffalo
County.
Brief of Amicus Curiae, Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), 10-11 (information up-
dated as of 1978) (footnotes omitted).
Justice Rehnquist noted with favor Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), which recog-
nized the need for diverse approaches which enable local officers to deal with their own local-
ized problems. The Court in Wolf refused to extend the exclusionary rule to state courts
trying state crimes. Id at 33.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 654-55, overruled Wolf. The Court in Mapp maintained that
the facts supporting the decision in Wolf had changed: more states had shifted toward the
exclusionary rule, id at 651; other remedies for unlawful police activity had been found want-
ing, id at 652; and federal law was now more consistent, id at 653.
80 413 U.S. 433 (1973). For a discussion of the case, see notes 122-25 & accompanying text
infra.
81 428 U.S. 364 (1976). For a discussion of the case, see notes 126-34 & accompanying text
infra.
82 The plurality had argued that since the Court had applied the automobile exception
when the car was immobile, there must be another rationale underlying the exception. Writ-
ing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist maintained that the mobility rationale for the auto-
mobile exception was based on the inherent mobility of automobiles as a class rather than on
the mobility of a particular automobile. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. at 440-41.
His interpretation of the automobile exception rationale, however, is unfaithful to the
exception as set out in Carroll. Carroll required probable cause to search the automobile and
the existence of an exigency. Id at 153. Chambers also required the presence of these factors,
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. at 51, even though it allowed a later search of the automo-
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personal property found within an automobile during a valid search of
the automobile under the exception.8 3 Justice Rehnquist stressed that
even if the automobile exception did not apply and Sanders controlled,
the officer lawfully searched the packages found within the luggage
compartment of Robbins' station wagon because the packages fell
within the exceptions recognized by Sanders.8 4 Although he agreed with
the plurality that the Court must simplify fourth amendment analysis,
Justice Rehnquist maintained that the answer was not to expand Chad-
wick and Sanders, but to apply the automobile exception to cases such as
Robbis. 83
Justice Stevens argued in dissent for the application of the automo-
bile exception,86 reminding the other justices that neither Chadwick nor
Sanders dealt with a factual situation within the framework of the auto-
mobile exception.8 7 He further stressed that a recognized exception to
bile for safety reasons, id at 52 n. 10. Justice Rehnquist's analysis would remove the exigent
circumstance requirement.
A car's mobility in most circumstances provides the exigency, but it is based on the
factual situation and not the car's inherent nature. Justice Rehnquist has made the mistake
of attempting to place search and seizure cases involving automobiles within the exception
merely because an automobile is involved. For example, he tried to justify the automobile
inventory searches in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, and South Dakota v. Opperman,
428 U.S. 364, based on the inherent mobility of automobiles. In Cad, the car searched had
been wrecked, 413 U.S. at 435-36, and in Opperman, the contents of the car were inventoried
after officers towed it to an impoundment lot, 428 U.S. at 365-66. For a discussion of Cady
and Opperman, see notes 119-34 & accompanying text incfa.
83 "If 'contraband goods concealed and illegally transported in an automobile or other
vehicle may be searched for without a warrant,'. . . then, in my view, luggage and similar
containers found in an automobile may be searched for contraband without a warrant." 101
S. Ct. at 2853 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 769
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. at 153)).
84 Rather than looking solely to the appearance of the package to determine whether a
warrant was required to open it as implied by Sanders, Justice Rehnqusit looked to the totality
of the circumstances. Based on the marijuana and paraphernalia already discovered, Rob-
bins' statement, and the officer's recognition that marijuana is often packaged in the same
way as the bags discovered, Robbins did not have an expectation of privacy in the bags
warranting the officer to await the decision of a magistrate. Id at 2854.
85 Chadwick, Sanders, and Robbins do indicate a progression of increased protection afforded
containers in the name of the fourth amendment. Chadwick disallowed the search of a double
locked footlocker. Sanders disallowed the warrantless search of an unlocked suitcase. Not
until Robbins, however, did the Court extend the warrant requirement to all closed containers.
"Apparently, the plurality today decides that distinguishing between containers found in a
car is too difficult a task. . . ." Id at 2854 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
86 Id. at 2855 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "In my opinion, the 'automobile exception' to the
warrant requirement therefore provided each officer the authority to make a thorough search
of the vehicle including the glove compartment, the trunk, and any containers in the vehicle
that might reasonably contain the contraband." Justice Stevens believed that the plurality
had engaged in an "unprecedented and unnecessary narrowing of the automobile exception."
Id at 2857.
87 Relying on Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion in Sanders, Justice Stevens argued
that since neither Chadwick nor Siaders were automobile exception cases, the pre-Chadwick law
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the warrant requirement, like the automobile exception, justifies as
broad a search as if a warrant had been issued.88 Therefore, he reasoned
that the search of the container found during a valid warrantless search
was itself valid since, if the officer had had a warrant to search the auto-
mobile and found a suitcase in the process, the officer could have
searched the suitcase without a warrant from a magistrate. 89
III. UNREASONABLE APPLICATION OF THE CONTAINER CASES
Robbins presented the Court with only one issue for determination:
the propriety90 of the officer's search of the green garbage bags found in
Robbins' station wagon during a valid automobile exception search. 9t
The case provided a classic confrontation between the dichotomous per-
spectives of fourth amendment 92 analysis. On the one hand, the Court
could have adopted the reasonableness approach of the automobile ex-
ception to justify the warrantless search of the packages. On the other
allowing the warrantless search of containers discovered during the valid search of an auto-
mobile remained intact. Id at 2855-56. He pointed out that in neither Chadwick nor Sanders.
did the officers have probable cause to search the automobiles involved. "The issue...
would have been exactly the same if the officers had apprehended the suspects before they
placed the footlocker in the trunk of the car in Chadwick or before they hailed the taxi in
Sanders." Id at 2856 (footnote omitted). Justice Stevens maintained that although Sanders
involved a moving vehicle, it was not within the automobile exception. He reasoned that to
uphold the warrantless search of the suitcase merely because the officers waited to seize it
after it was placed in a moving vehicle would allow officers to evade the mandate of Chadwick.
Id This rejected Justice Blackmun's view in Chadwick that if the officers had waited for
Chadwick to drive away, the automobile exception would have applied. See note 73 supra.
88 Justice Stevens did not provide any support for this contention. He might, however,
look to Terry for support. Teny established that the scope of a reasonable search is determined
by the initial justification for the intrusion. Id at 19-20.
89 101 S. Ct. at 2857 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "Similarly, if a magistrate issues a warrant
for the search of a house, police executing that warrant clearly need not obtain a separate
warrant for the search of a suitcase found in the house, so long as the things to be seized could
reasonably be found in such a suitcase." Id at 2857, n.8.
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) supports Justice Steven's position. In Hayden,
the Court upheld the warrantless search of a flush tank, the area underneath a mattress, a
chest drawer, and a washing machine based on the exigency of hot pursuit. Id at 297-98.
The scope of the warrantless search in Hayden extended to anything or any place where the
suspebt could have hidden or where he could have hidden a weapon. Similarly, the automo-
bile exception should extend to any container within the automobile where the occupant
could have hidden contraband.
90 The word properly is used because the Court did not look to the reasonableness of the
warrantless search based on the facts and circumstances confronting the officer. See notes
146-55 & accompanying text infia.
9t It was the only issue before the court. All the justices accepted the validity of the initial
stop. They also either accepted the search of the automobile as valid, or, as in justice Powell's
case, viewed it as irrelevant.
92 The fourth amendment establishes "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,.., and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause... " U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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hand, the Court could, and did, rely on the warrant requirement of the
container cases to invalidate the search.
The lawfulness of a container search arising during a lawful war-
rantless search of an automobile was an issue of first impression for the
Court. The automobile exception cases previously before the Court had
not involved the opening of separate containers. 93 Similarly, the facts of
the container cases had not fit the classic requirements of the automobile
exception. 94 This Note argues that, in analyzing the interface of the
automobile and the container doctrines, the Court misapplied the for-
mer and over-extended the latter.
The plurality, in adopting the diminished expectation of privacy
rationale of Chadwick and Sanders, misconstrued the automobile excep-
tion. The automobile exception decisions never relied on a lesser expec-
tation of privacy in an automobile to support a warrantless search.
The Supreme Court established the automobile exception in Carroll
v. UnitedStates.95 ChiefJustice Taft, writing for the majority, upheld the
warrantless search of an automobile stopped on a public highway by
prohibition agents, because they had probable cause to believe the auto-
mobile was carrying contraband liquor.96 Based upon a review of Con-
gressional enactments authorizing government agents to search for and
93 The automobile exception cases did not rule on whether an officer could open a
container found within the automobile searched. In Carroll and the cases that followed, the
contraband was not within a container that hid its identity. See Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160 (1949) (officers found cases of whiskey); Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251
(1938) (no discussion of how whiskey was found); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931)
(no indication that contraband whiskey was in a container that hid its identity); United
States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927) (Coast Guardsman saw cases of grain alcohol on deck).
Justice Brandeis upheld the seizure under the plain view exception, id at 563, the arrest
search exception, id, and Carroll, id). Nor does a container appear to have been involved in
the more recent automobile cases. See Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (per curiam) (no
container was involved); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (Some coins were found
in a glove, but it is not clear from the record that the coins were used as evidence, nor is it
clear that a glove constitutes a container.).
94 See notes 135-43 & accompanying text infia.
95 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The Court pointed out that the exception was distinct from the
search incident to an arrest exception mentioned in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914). "The right to search and the validity of the seizure are not dependent on the right to
arrest. They are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer has for belief that the
contents of the automobile offend against the law." Id at 158-59. Justices McReynolds and
Sutherland argued in dissent that the seizure was unlawful because it followed an unlawful
arrest. Id at 168 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
Other federal courts had upheld the warrantless search of an automobile prior to Carroll.
See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 286 F. 930 (4th Cir. 1923); Lambart v. United States, 282 F.
413 (9th Cir. 1922).
96 According to Chief Justice Taft, "[o]n reason and authority the true rule" was:
[i]f the search and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable cause, that is,
upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that
an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and de-
struction, the search and seizure are valid.
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seize contraband, Chief Justice Taft concluded that for purposes of the
warrant requirement, the fourth amendment recognized a difference be-
tween permanent structures97 and mobile vehicles. 98 The statutes he re-
viewed required that federal agents obtain a warrant to search a
dwelling, but allowed the agents to search vehicles, ships, animals, and
other means of transportation without a warrant.99 Applying this dis-
267 U.S. at 149.
In Carroll, three federal prohibition agents patrolling between Detroit and Grand Rapids
recognized Carroll's automobile as it passed them, headed for Detroit. Earlier, two of the
agents had attempted to buy liquor from Carroll and a companion, but the latter two never
returned with the liquor. Id at 134-36.
97 A comparison of Carroll and Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925), decided the
same term, highlights the difference in treatment afforded buildings and moving vehicles by
the Court. The Court in Agndello refused to allow the warrantless search of Agnello's home
even though the officers had probable cause to search the house. Id at 33. "The search of a
private dwelling without a warrant is in itself unreasonable and abhorrent to our laws. Con-
gress has never passed an act purporting to authorize the search of a house without a war-
rant." Id at 32. In Carroll, the Court looked to a long history of Congressional legislation
authorizing warrantless searches of vehicles by customs agents. Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. at 150-54.
98 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. at 153:
[he guarantee of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth
Amendment has been construed, practically since the beginning of the Government, as
recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or other
structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a
search of a ship, motorboat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quicky moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
(Emphasis added).
99 Most of the examples of legislation provided by the majority authorized customs offi-
cials to search without a warrant those vehicles suspected of concealing contraband or goods
with unpaid duties. Temporally, the examples stretched from ones contemporaneous with
the adoption of the fourth amendment, I Stat. 29, 43 (July 31, 1789), to the National Prohibi-
tion Act, Ch. 85, Tit. II § 25, 41 Stat. 305, 315 (October 28, 1919). See Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. at 150-54 for the examples cited by Chief Justice Taft. For a criticism of
Carroll's reliance on the statutes see F. BLACK, ILL-STARRED PROHIBITION CASES 21-27
(1931).
Customs officials continue to enjoy the right to search for contraband without a warrant.
See 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1976) (authorized officers may "stop, search, and examine, . . . any
vehicle, beast, or person, on which or whom he or they shall suspect there is subject to duty, or
shall have been introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to law . ."); 19
U.S.C. § 1496 (1976) (customs officer can search "baggage of any person arriving in the
United States. .. 2).
For recent Supreme Court decisions recognizing the border exception to the warrant
requirement, and delineating the definition of border, the level of suspicion required to justify
the intrusion, and the scope of the search, see United States v. Martinez-Fuentes, 428 U.S. at
562 (stops at border checkpoints do not require reasonable suspicion); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884 (stops by border patrol require reasonable suspicion); Al-
meida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973) (twenty miles from border not
within the border area).
At least one lower court case has allowed certain border searches on less than reasonable
suspicion. See United States v. Sandler, 644 F.2d 1163, 1169 (5th Cir. 1981) (mere suspicion
justifies a pat-down search and the removal of outer garments).
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tinction to the facts of Carroll, he concluded that, "a search warrant [is]
unnecessary where there is probable cause to search an automobile
stopped on the highway [for contraband]; the car is movable, the occu-
pants are alerted, and the car's contents may never be found again if a
warrant must be obtained." 100
The Carroll decision established two requirements for a warrantless
search under the automobile exception. The officer had to have proba-
ble cause' 0 1 to believe the automobile contained contraband, 0 2 and an
exigency 10 3 had to exist to necessitate the warrantless search. The mo-
bile nature of the particular automobile and the fact that probable
cause developed suddenly supplied the exigency.
The Carroll doctrine remained unchanged through a number of ap-
plications to factually similar cass.' 04 Not until the Burger Court's reaf-
firmation of the exception in Chambers v. Maroney, 105 did the Court alter
the doctrine. Justice White, for the Court, reaffirmed the difference be-
tween the search of a mobile vehicle and a permanent situs.10 6 He reas-
serted the two requirements of the automobile exception, but further
extended the exception to cover the warrantless search of an automobile
after police had moved it to the station house. 10 7 Previously, the war-
100 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970).
101 After briefly surveying the definitions of probable cause, the Carroll Court formulated a
rule upon which the Court still relies. The prohibition agents had probable cause to stop the
automobile and search it for liquor because "the facts and circumstances within their knowl-
edge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient in themselves
to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief..." that liquor was in the automobile.
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. at 162.
102 The majority made clear that its decision did not sanction the stopping of an automo-
bile at any time for any reason. Every citizen has a "right to free passage [on public high-
ways] without interruption or search unless there is known to a competent official authorized
to search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal
merchandise." Id at 154. "It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent
were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor .. " Id at 153-
54.
103 An "exigency exists only when the police do not have a reasonable period of time in
which to obtain a warrant." C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 2, at 148.
104 See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Scher v. United States, 305 U.S.
251 (1938); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931).
105 399 U.S. 42 (1970). The Court upheld the warrantless search of an automobile in
which Chambers was a passenger. The Court found that probable cause existed to search the
car because it matched the description of an automobile used an hour earlier in a robbery, the
number of occupants matched the number seen in the get-away car, the clothing worn by one
of the occupants matched the clothing worn by one of the robbers, and a trench coat in the
car was similar to the trench coat worn by another of the robbers. Id at 44-45.
106 He recognized that Carroll had approved of the warrantless search of vehicles "in cir-
cumstances that would not justify the search without a warrant of a house or an office, pro-
vided that there is probable cause to believe that the car contains articles that the officers are
entitled to seize." Id at 48.
107 "The probable-cause factor still obtained at the station house and so did the mobility of
the car unless the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless seizure of the car and the denial
Vol. 721192
OF CARS, CONTAINERS, AND CONFUSION
rantless search had occurred where the vehicle was stopped. 108
The Court in Chambers based the warrantless search solely on the
exigent development of probable cause and the exigent circumstances
posed by a mobile vehicle. 109 Dictum in later Supreme Court decisions,
however, pointed to Chambers as indicating that mobility alone did not
underlie the exception since the officers had seized and moved the car
prior to searching it. Chadwick and Sanders based their requirement of a
warrant to search personal luggage on this dictum. The Court in each
case pointed out that potential mobility was not always present when a
warrantless search of an automobile transpired and that an officer could
search an automobile without a warrant in situations that would require
a warrant to search a house. For these reasons, the Court presumed that
a lesser expectation of privacy in automobiles also justified the automo-
bile exception.
In Chadwick, Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion refused to up-
hold the warrantless search of a double-locked foot locker which was
seized by officers from the open trunk of Chadwick's automobile, taken
of its use to anyone until a warrant is secured." Id at 52. The majority believed it was
impractical and potentially unsafe to require an officer to search the car in a dark parking lot
in the middle of the night. Delaying the search until the officers brought the car to the station
also increased the protection they could afford the car and the valuables within it. Id at 51
n.10. The Court saw no constitutional difference between seizing the car and holding it until
the officer obtained a warrant, and allowing the officer to search the car immediately without
a warrant. Id
108 For an extension of Chambers, see Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 67-68 (1975) (per curiam)
(upheld mid-day warrantless search of a car officers had driven from a bank parking lot to
their headquarters before searching). See also United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 803
(1974) (applied reasoning similar to Chambers' in an examination of a search incident to an
arrest).
Like Chambers, While involved the valid seizure of an automobile under the automobile
exception and a subsequent warrantless search of the automobile after officers took it to police
headquarters. 423 U.S. at 67-68. Unlike Chambers, the Whie Court did not determine
whether the officers were reasonable in waiting to search the car at the station house. Id at
68. The dissent maintained that since the officers seized the car in the afternoon and no
safety or practicality problems were shown, it was neither impractical nor unsafe for the of-
ficers to search the car at the scene. Id at 70 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The majority held
that if the officers had probable cause to search the automobile at the scene, they could also
wait and search the automobile at the station house without first obtaining a warrant. Id at
68.,
109 Justice Blackmun took no part in the decision. Justice Harlan accepted the stop and
seizure of the automobile under the automobile exception, but dissented because the Court
upheld the later search of the car at the police station. Id at 62-64 (Harlan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
The eight justices who participated in the Chambers case accepted the automobile excep-
tion with its two requirements of probable cause and exigent circumstances. Harlan argued
that the exigent circumstances did not justify searching the automobile at the station house in




to their headquarters, and searched by them over an hour later. 110 The
Court ruled that Chadwick had manifested a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the footlocker, thereby necessitating a warrant to search it. I1I
The government asserted that luggage, due to its mobile nature, should
be governed by a rule analogous to the automobile exception. 112 The
Court stated that the similarities between an automobile and luggage
were not great enough to merit the application of such a rule. 113 The
majority pointed out that mobility was not the sole rationale for the
automobile exception. Another basis for the exception was the lesser
expectation of privacy that existed in automobiles. Chief Justice Burger
contended that this lesser expectation did not apply to luggage. 14
Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in Sanders similarly held that
the automobile exception did not justify the warrantless search of a
closed suitcase believed to contain contraband which was seized from
the trunk of a cab. 115 As in Chadwick, he noted that the automobile
exception indicated a lesser expectation of privacy in an automobile. 116
He highlighted this expectation of privacy difference between
automobiles and luggage to support his conclusion. 117
11o United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). Federal agents in San Diego informed
agents stationed in Boston of their suspicion that a trunk due to arrive in Boston in two days
contained contraband. The agents staked out the train station on the day the trunk was due
to arrive. A dog trained to identify marijuana signaled that there was marijuana inside the
trunk. The agents did not move in, however, until the two travelers with the footlocker joined
up with Chadwick, and had placed the footlocker in the trunk of Chadwick's car. Id at 3-5.
111 Id at 11. The Court maintained that locking one's personal effects within luggage
manifested the same privacy interest as securing one's home. Id
112 Id at 11-12.
113 Id at 12-13. The Court compared the automobile and the suitcase as to purpose, pub-
lic visibility, and government regulation. See note 46 supra.
114 Id at 12-13. The majority contended that mobility alone did not justify the automobile
exception because the Court had upheld the warrantless search of immobile vehicles. For
support the Court cited South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976); Texas v.
White, 423 U.S. 67, 96 (1975); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1973); Chambers
v. Marone, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); and Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967). The Court
concluded that if mobility was not the sole rationale for the automobile exception, then it
must be based on the "diminished expectation of privacy which surrounds the automobile."
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 12. Furthermore, "[t]he factors which diminish the
privacy aspects of an automobile. . .," do not apply to luggage. Id at 13. "In sum, a per-
son's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automo-
bile." Id Of the cases cited by the Court, however, only White and Chambers fall within the
automobile exception.
115 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 761-62. Little Rock police, acting on a tip which
precisely indicated when Sanders would arrive in Little Rock, and accurately described the
type of luggage containing contraband which he would be carrying, staked out the Little
Rock airport. The officers stopped Sanders' cab as it left the airport, took Sanders' suitcase
from the trunk, and searched it. Id at 755-56.
116 Id at 764-65.
117 The majority stated that the same level of expectation of privacy existed in the suitcase
whether the officers removed it from an automobile or seized it from other locations. The
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Chadwick and Sanders were not the first decisions to articulate an
alternative rationale for the automobile exception. Several cases involv-
ing automobiles, but not within the .automobile exception, have main-
tained that a lower expectation of privacy supports the exception." 8
The plurality cited Cad4y v. Dombrowski 19 and SoUth Dakota v. Ofiperman 120
as indicating that mobility alone did not justify the automobile
exception.' 21
Cady involved the inventory search of an automobile for public
safety reasons. The Court ruled that the public safety concern made the
warrantless search reasonable. 122 This concern arguably provided the
exigency necessary for an automobile exception search. At the time that
the officer conducted the search, however, neither he nor anyone else
knew that a crime had been commmitted or that the driver of the auto-
mobile might be involved.' 23 In other words, the officer did not have
probable cause to believe the car contained evidence of a crime. 124 Not
only was Cady not within the automobile exception, but the Court in its
dicta discussing the exception did not allude to a lesser expectation of
privacy in automobiles as a rationale for the exception.125
reasons justifying a warrantless search of an automobile did not apply to searches of personal
luggage. Id at 764-65.
118 The extension of the automobile exception in Chambers to allow the officers to search
the automobile without a warrant after they had seized it and moved it does cast doubt on
the exigency requirement of the exception. To maintain the exigent element the Court cre-
ated a fiction: once the exigency developed, it attached itself to the situation even after the
officers removed the car. Chambers v. Maroney, 339 U.S. at 51-52.
119 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
120 428 U.S. 364 (1976)..
121 101 S. Ct. at 2845.
122 Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. at 447. The majority contended that the possibility
that an intruder might obtain the revolver justified the "caretaking 'search'." Id at 447. The
police in the rural Wisconsin community had acted reasonably in removing the car from the
scene of the accident, id at 446, and in searching the automobile rather than posting a guard
until they obtained a search warrant. Id at 447.
123 Local Indiana police took Dombrowski, who was involved in a wreck, to the hospital.
He mentioned to the officers that he was a Chicago policeman. Because the officers did not
find a gun on Dombrowski (they believed that Chicago policemen were required to carry
their gun at all times), they were concerned that vandals might break into the wrecked auto-
mobile, find the gun, and steal it. During a search of the wrecked automobile for the gun, the
officer discovered various blood-covered items in the trunk. These items linked Dombrowski
to a murder, and led to his conviction. Id at 435-38.
124 The officer did not expect nor have reason to believe that he would discover evidence of
a crime in the trunk of Dombrowski's car. The police were unaware of the murder at the time
of the search. Id at 447. Since the officer did not believe that the automobile was involved in
criminal activity, the officer did not have probable cause, as recognized by Carroll, to search
the automobile.
The dissent argued that the automobile exception did not justify the search, not because
of a lack of probable cause, but because the automobile was immobile. No exigent circum-
stance existed. Id at 451 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125 Justice Rehnquist, in his opinion for the Cady majority, mentioned the difference be-
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Neither did Opperman's facts bring it within the automobile excep-
tion. The Court upheld the conviction of Opperman based on evidence
found by an officer during an inventory search of Opperman's automo-
bile, which had been towed from a "no parking" zone. 126 The officer
searched the car pursuant to department regulations and not because he
expected to find evidence of a crime within the automobile. In Opper-
man, there was no probable cause and no exigent circumstances. 127
Chief Justice Burger in Opperman advanced the alternate rationale
of a lesser expectation of privacy in automobiles to justify the warrant-
less search. 128 The cases he cited for support, however, did not sustain
his conclusion.' 29 The Chief Justice compared the frequency of state
tween automobiles and dwellings twice, but not in connection with a lesser expectation of
privacy. Id at 442, 447-48. Justice Rehnquist attempted in dictum to extend the automobile
exception to cover the warrantless search of any automobile because of the inherent mobility
of automobiles as a class. Id at 441. He believed the difference in treatment of vehicles and
dwellings was due to both the "ambulatory character" of vehicles, and the opportunities they
presented state and local officials for discovering evidence in plain view while performing
their caretaking functions. Id at 442.
This caretaking function brought the officer in Cady into a position to see the bloody
items in the trunk. If the caretaking function is a valid basis for inventory searches, then the
Cady decision falls within the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. The plain
view exception allows an officer to seize items he can see from a location where he has a right
to be. Air Pollution Control Board v. Western Alfalfi Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865 (1974); Coo-
lidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 467-68.
126 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 365-67.
127 Id at 365-66. During the inventory search the officer found marijuana in the glove
compartment. When Opperman came to claim his car, the police arrested him for possession
of marijuana. The officer conducting the inventory testified that the inventory of the car's
contents was taken to safeguard the articles in the automobile. The department had exper-
ienced problems with vandals breaking into impounded cars. Id at 366 n. .
Chief Justice Burger, in applying the reasonableness standard of the fourth amendment
to the "protective inventory," noted that courts dealing with the issue had not determined
whether probable cause justified the inventory. He believed the courts were correct in not
reaching the issue because the inventory was not a criminal procedure. Probable cause ap-
plies only to criminal investigations. Id at 370, n.5. See also id at 383 (Powell, J., concur-
ring). Since probable cause was not relevant to the majority, the automobile exception by
definition would not apply to Opperman.
128 Id at 367. He asserted that the exigency required by the automobile exception was
supplied by the inherent mobility of automobiles. He cited Carroll and Coolidge for support.
Taken together those two cases show that inherent mobility does not always supply he exigent
circumstance. Carroll approved the warrantless search of an automobile stopped on a public
highway. Coolidge disapproved the warrantless search of an automobile seized in a driveway,
taken to the police station, and then searched. The difference in the two cases was the lack of
an exigency in Coolidge: the police had ample opportunity to obtain a warrant. 403 U.S. at
462 ("no alerted criminal bent on flight, no fleeting opportunity on an open highway after a
hazardous chase, no contraband or stolen goods or weapons, no confederates waiting to move
the evidence, not even the inconvenience of a special police detail to guard the immobilized
automobile").
129 See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42; see also notes 107, 114 supra; Cooper v.
California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967). In Cooper, the Court upheld the warrantless search of an
automobile which was seized and impounded for forfeiture proceedings under state law. The
OF CARS, CONTAINERS, AND CONFUSION
and local police contact with automobiles, 130 and the warrant require-
ments for nonconsensual administrative searches mandated by Camara v.
Municipal Court of San Francisco'13 and See v. City of Seattle.132 He implied
that since local police contact concerning traffic violations did not re-
quire a warrant, and administrative searches did require one, the auto-
mobile must have a lower expectation of privacy. 33 This reasoning
ignores the rationale of the automobile exception cases.' 34
Although the automobile exception decisions in Carroll and its
progeny recognized that a difference existed between automobiles and
houses for warrant purposes, none of the decisions asserted that the pri-
vacy expected in an automobile was less than the privacy expected in a
dwelling. The Court continued to require that an officer must have
probable cause to search a vehicle just as he is required to have probable
cause to search a dwelling.'3 5 The Court dispensed with the warrant in
the case of an automobile searched under the exception because of its
mobility. The mobility made it unreasonable to require an officer to
obtain a warrant prior to the search.
The plurality ignored tle mobility rationale stated in the Carroll
and Chambers line of automobile exception cases and, instead, adopted
the underlying rationale of Chadwick and Sanders-that the expectation
of privacy in an automobile is less than in a container. The plurality
concluded that, although the warrantless search of the automobile was
reasonable, a warrantless search of the container found within the auto-
Court held the search reasonable in light of the time the police would have to hold the car
prior to its forfeiture. id at 61-62.
130 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367-68. See also note 125 supra.
131 387 U.S. 523.
132 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
133 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367, n.2.
134 There is some merit in Chief Justice Burger's analysis if the owner of an automobile is
similar to the owner of a pervasively regulated business. See Donovan v. Dewey, 101 S. Ct.
2534 (1981); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972); Colonade Corp. v. United
States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970).
There are, however, differences between these cases and the individual driver or occu-
pant of an automobile. First, the above three cases involved a federal interest prompting the
warrantless search, Donovan v. Dewey, 101 S. Ct. at 2538-39, whereas automobile regulation
is a state and local function, Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. at 440-41. Second, the warrant-
less search was established by statute in Dewq, Biswell, and Colonade. Dewey v. Donovan, 101
S. Ct. at 2539.
135 "[O]ur cases have consistently recognized that the nature and substantiality of interest
required to justify a search of private areas of an automobile is no less than that necessary to
justify an intrusion of similar scope into a home or office." South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. at 388 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan and Stewart, who joined with Mar-
shall's Oppemzan dissent, advocated the lesser expectation of privacy rational for the automo-
bile exception in Robbins. Their position in Robbins is contrary to the Marshall position in
Opperman and another reason why the automobile search cases are so confusing.
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mobile was unreasonable. 136 The plurality was incorrect in accepting
the Chadwick-Sanders interpretation of the rationale underlying the auto-
mobile exception because neither Chadwick nor Sanders fit within the
exception.
The Court in Chadwick made clear that it was not considering the
need for a warrant to search a container found during a valid warrant-
less search of an automobile. 137 Several Justices in Sanders, however, in-
dicated that they considered the case within the exception.1 38 The facts
of both Chadwick and Sanders failed to indicate the prerequisites of a
warrantless search under the automobile exception-probable cause
and exigent circumstances.
The officers in both Chadwick and Sanders had probable cause to
believe that the footlocker and the suitcase, respectively, contained con-
traband. 139 Unlike Carroll and Chambers, where the officers had proba-
ble cause to believe the automobiles contained contraband or evidence
of a crime, the officers in Chadwick and Sanders did not have probable
cause to search the automobiles. Probable cause to search the contain-
ers had developed prior to the introduction of the automobiles into the
factual pattern. If Chadwick and Sanders had not placed their contain-
ers within the automobiles, the investigation would not have focused on
the automobiles at all. "The relationship between the automobile and
the contraband was purely incidental" 14 in these cases.
136 101 S. Ct. at 2847.
137 The question for which certiorari was granted did not even mention automobiles:
"[w]hether a search warrant is required before federal agents may open a locked footlocker
which they have lawfully seized at the time of the arrest of its owners, when there is probable
cause to believe the footlocker contains contraband." United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at
3. The government did not contend that the automobile exception applied; it merely at-
tempted to analogize from it. Id. at 11-12. Justice Blackmun implied that the case was not
within the automobile exception by pointing out changes in the facts that would have made
the exception applicable. Id at 22-23 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See note 145 infra. See 2 W.
LAFAVE, supra note 2, at 538-39.
138 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 764-65; Id at 768 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Only
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens actually maintained that Sanders was not within the
automobile exception. Id at 766-67 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
139 See notes 110, 115 supra respectively.
140 Chief Justice Burger reminded the majority in Sanders that the automobile exception
did not apply to Chadwick. The automobile in Chadwick was an incidental aspect of the fac-
tual situation. The focus in both cases was on containers rather than automobiles. Arkansas
v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 766-67 (Burger, CJ., concurring). He stressed that the Chadwick deci-
sion only held that a person's expectation of privacy in personal luggage did not decrease
simply because it was in his possession when he was arrested in a public place. Id
He further urged the Court to apply the same analysis to Sanders: "[I]t was the luggage
being transported by respondent at the time of the arrest, not the automobile in which it was
being carried, that was the suspected locus of the contraband. The relationship between thee
automobile and the contraband was purely coincidental, as in Chadwick." Id at 767 (Burger,
C.J., concurring).
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Similarly, no exigent circumstance existed in either Chadwick or
Sanders. In each of the automobile exception cases, the officer had unex-
pectedly come upon a car traveling on a public roadway which he had
probable cause to search.14' In Chadwick and in Sanders, however, the
officers were tipped as to the approximate time and place of arrival of
the suspects and their identity. The officers also expected to find the
footlocker and the suitcase with the suspects. In each situation, the of-
ficers had enough time and information to obtain a warrant to search
the luggage, 42 but failed to do so. Since neither case was within the
automobile exception, it is not surprising that both Chadwick and Sanders
required warrants to search the containers. If a search does not fall
within a recognized exception to the warrant clause, a warrant is
required.143
The determination that Chadwick and Sanders are not within the
automobile exception still leaves unanswered the question whether the
automobile exception or Chadwick-Sanders should control Robbins. The
facts of Robbins support a finding of exigent circumstances as did the
facts in Carroll and Chambers. The highway patrolmen did not expect to
find Robbins on that early morning, and when they did, they could ftot
have fulfilled both of their responsibilities: stopping Robbins and also
obtaining a warrant. The officers in Chadwick and in Sanders, on the
other hand, had prior knowledge of the suspects' arrival and could have
obtained a warrant.
The development of probable cause in Robbins is also more similar
to the pattern seen in the automobile exception cases. Although in Car-
roll probable cause existed from the moment the officers saw the sus-
pect's automobile pass them,' 4 in Chambers, probable cause did not
develop until after the officer had stopped the automobile and had seen
the occupants. 45 Similarly, in Robbins probable cause developed after
the officer had stopped the car and noticed Robbins' rapid speech and
lack of coordination, the marijuana odor, and the tweezers on the front
seat. Unlike the police in Chadwick or Sanders, the California troopers
did not have advance notice that Robbins was headed their way or that
he was carrying contraband.
The plurality, by adopting the dicta of the container cases and ex-
tending them to a warrantless search under the automobile exception,
141 This is the way the automobile exception exigency normally develops. Moyan, supra
note 2, at 1006.
142 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 755-56; United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 3.
143 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 454-55; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at
357.
144 See note 97 & accompanying text supra.
145 Se note 105 & accompanying text sura.
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futher confused this area of fourth amendment law. The plurality could
have better attained its goal of clarity if it had reaffirmed the two re-
quirements of the automobile exception, dismissed the lesser expectation
of privacy rationale as confusing dicta, and rejected the container cases
as inapplicable to the facts of Robbins.
IV. REASONABLE APPLICATION OF THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION
In extending the warrant requirement of the container cases to the
garbage bags found in the station wagon, the Robbins plurality mis-
analyzed Robbins' expectation of privacy. Furthermore, the plurality
cut short its analysis. Even if Robbins had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the garbage bags, the plurality should have continued its
analysis to determine the reasonableness of extending the automobile
exception to the bags.
The fourth amendment protects only reasonable expectations of
privacy. 146 The facts and circumstances of the situation determine the
reasonableness of an expectation of privacy.1 47 Chadwick and Sanders
seemed to indicate that an individual manifests a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in personal luggage by closing it. 148 In extending the
warrant requirement to all closed opaque containers,' 49 the Robbins plu-
rality focused solely on whether the package was closed ' 50 and ignored
146 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). The Court has ac-
cepted Justice Harlan's analysis of subjective and objective expectations of privacy to deter-
mine the reasonableness of the expectation. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 9.
147 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 765 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 9; Cooper
v. California, 386 U.S. at 59; Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963).
148 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 764 n.13; United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13.
149 The Sanders Court explicitly recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant when the
"contents can be inferred from [the package's] outward appearance" or when the contents are
in plain view. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 764 n.13. Taken alone the footnote might
indicate that the Court would not recognize any other exceptions. Sanders, however, stressed
the inherently personal nature of the contents of suitcases, id at 764-65, which implies that
containers that generally do not contain personal effects are not protected by the fourth
amendment warrant requirement. Also, the Court noted that it would be difficult to know
which packages required a warrant. Id at 764-65 n.13. This led one commentator to con-
clude that the list of examples was not exhaustive. 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 2, at 76-77
(Supp. 1981).
Chadwick dealt solely with personal items put into a locked container. United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11. LaFave argues that Chadwick only required a warrant to search a
container when no exigent circumstance existed to justify the warrantless search. 2 W.
LAFAVE, supra note 2, at 542-43.
150 101 S. Ct. at 2845. The plurality applied a quasi plain view test to determine the
reasonableness of opening a container without a warrant. Sanders first alluded to this test
when it outlined some possible exceptions to the warrant requirement. Arkansas v. Sanders,
442 U.S. at 764-65, n. 13. Since the Court in Sanders and the plurality in Robbins allowed the
officers to seize the suitcase and the packages it seems unreasonable to allow the officers to
open the packages without a warrant only if the officers could see the contents of the pack-
ages. If the officers could smell marijuana in the package or the package's weight and consis-
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the personal luggage aspect of the Chadwick and Sanders holdings.' 51
The plurality confused the determination of whether the individual had'
manifested an expectation of privacy with whether the privacy expecta-
tion was reasonable. Whether a package is transparent or opaque, open
or closed, is relevant in determining whether the person manifested an
expectation of privacy. These same considerations, however, do not in-
dicate whether the expectation was reasonable.
The facts and circumstances of Robbizs do not indicate a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the garbage bags. First, reasonableness is an
objective determination based on societal norms. 152 Society's finding
that an expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed suitcase or
closed footlocker was reasonable does not mean that society would view
a similar expectation of privacy in a closed dixie cup, brown paper sack,
or garbage bag as reasonable. 153 Yet, the plurality extended societal ap-
proval to an expectation of privacy in these latter containers merely be-
cause the containers were closed. Second, the officer inferred from the
appearance of the bags that they contained marijuana. 54 The plurality
discounted this inference because the officer had never seen marijuana
packaged in garbage bags. 155 The officer's testimony that he had knowl-
edge of this practice, coupled with Robbins' statement indicating that
more marijuana was secreted in the luggage compartment, indicated
that no reasonable expectation of privacy existed in the garbage bags at
the time of the search.
Even if the plurality correctly determined that there was a reason-
able expectation of privacy in the garbage bags, it does not automati-
cally follow that a warrant was required to search the bags. A finding of
a reasonable expectation of privacy only ensures that the Court will not
sanction an unreasonable intrusion of the privacy interest by the govern-
ment. When a recognized exception 156 to the warrant requirement is
tency indicated that marijuana was inside then the courts should allow the warrantless search
of the package. This result is consistent with a totality of the circumstances approach to
determining the reasonableness of a search.
151 101 S. Ct. at 2845. Justice Stewart explicitly rejected the proposition that the fourth
amendment only protected personal effects. See a so Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 764-65;
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11.
152 101 S. Ct. at 2847; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
153 "[When the effects are such things as coats and paper bags, the possessory interest and
privacy interest are much less distinct, and it is thus far easier to conclude that the latter
interest is not protected by the Warrant Clause whenever exigent circumstances allow a war-
rantless intrusion upon the former interest." 2 W. LAFAVE, 5gpra note 2, at 365 (footnote
omitted).
154 103 Cal. App. 3d at 40, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 783.
155 101 S. Ct. at 2847.
156 When the Court mentions the exceptions to the fourth amendment it inevitably cites
Katz for the proposition that "[s]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-
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present, no warrant is necessary for the intrusion. The automobile ex-
ception was present in Robbis.157
The underlying justifications of an exception are balanced against
the privacy interest invaded to determine whether the application of the
exception to the situation is reasonable.' 58 Since Carroll, the Court has
given great weight to the need of law enforcers with probable cause to
stop and search automobiles without a warrant in order to seize evi-
dence that could disappear if the officers obtained a warrant. The
Supreme Court viewed the need to preserve evidence as outweighing the
invasion of the privacy expected in an automobile.
The plurality in Robbins gave greater weight to the privacy interests
in containers and found that this higher level of expected privacy out-
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Id at 357 (foot-
notes omitted). If the exceptions are so well delineated, why does the Court face yet another
case requiring it to clarify the application or non-application of an exception?
The number of exceptions to the warrant requirement depends on how an exception is
defined and how the exceptions are labeled. The recognized exceptions include: the search
incident to an arrest, see, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (dwelling); Preston v.
United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964) (automobile); plain view, see, e.g., Air Pollution Vari-
ance Board v. Western Alfalfi Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865 (1974); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 467-68; Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 43; hot pursuit, see, e.g., Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99; searches by customs officials, see, e.g., United States v. Ramsey,
413 U.S. 606,616 (1977); administrative searches, see, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 101 S. Ct. 2534
(1981); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp. v.
United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77; automobile inventory searches, see, e.g., South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372; Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968); Cooper v.
California, 386 U.S. 58, 61-62 (1967); automobile exception, see, e.g., Texas v. White, 423 U.S.
67, 68; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158-
59.
Some commentators include 7ery v. Ohio and its progeny in a listing of warrant excep-
tions. Moylan, supra note 2, at 1032. Terry allowed an officer to stop and frisk a person when
the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous. 392 U.S. at 28-
30. For a discussion of Terry and its progeny and the development of the "stop and frisk"
concept, see Note, Fourth Amendment: Airport Searches and Seizures: Where Will the Court Land?, 71
J. CRIM. L. & C. 499 (1980). Tery is not an exception to the warrant requirement; it is an
exception to the need for probable cause.
Similarly, consent searches are treated as exceptions to the fourth amendment warrant
requirement, but with consent to search the question of probable cause never arises. See Moy-
Ian, supra note 2, at 988 n.8. For a discussion of consent searches, see Shneckloth v. Bustamonte:
The Question of Noncutodial and Custodial Searches; 66 J. CRIM. L. & C. 286 (1975). See also
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218; Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
For an exception the Court refused to recognize, see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,
394 (1978) (seriousness of the offense does not eliminate the need for a warrant).
The party seeking an exception to the warrant requirement has the burden of justifying
the exception. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 759-60, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. at 61
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
157 101 S. Ct. at 2847. The Court ruled that the search of the container occurred during
the lawful warrantless search of Robbins' automobile.
t58 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 21; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 534-35.
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weighed the government's need for an immediate search.' 59 In requir-
ing a warrant to search closed opaque containers, the plurality relied on
the comparison of privacy interests in automobiles and in luggage made
by the Court in Chadwick.160 The Chadwick Court cited three factors 161
that caused it to conclude that the level of privacy expected in an auto-
mobile was less than the expectation of privacy in a suitcase: whether
the object serves as a repository for personal effects, whether the contents
are in plain view, and whether the state regulates the object.162 Upon
close inspection, the factors do not indicate a significant difference be-
tween the privacy expected in a suitcase and in an automobile.
Chadwick first found that an automobile, unlike a suitcase, was not
a repository of personal effects. The basis for this conclusion is not clear.
The automobile does transport personal effects. In fact, the automobile,
like the suitcase, is a temporary container used to move personal effects
from one permanent repository to another. Only in unusual situations is
either the automobile or the suitcase more than a temporary storage
place for personal effects. 163 If a functional difference does exist between
an automobile and a suitcase it is no longer relevant in determining the
level of privacy expected. Justice Stewart in Robbins implicitly rejected
this factor when he rejected the State of California's argument that the
fourth amendment distinguishes between personal and impersonal prop-
erty. 64 If the fourth amendment protects personal and impersonal
159 The plurality adopted the view of the Court in Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 12-13, and Sand-
err, 443 U.S. at 763-64, that an officer could more easily seize a container and safely store it
until he obtained a warrant than he could seize and store an automobile. 101 S. Ct at 2845.
This view helped justify the Court's insistence that the officer obtain a warrant. The Court in
Chambers had earlier ruled that no constitutional difference existed between seizing the car
and holding it for a warrant or searching it immediately, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. at
52.
160 The difference afforded automobiles and homes by the fourth amendment underlies the
plurality's conclusion. Prior cases had interpreted this different treatment to indicate that a
lesser expectation of privacy existed in an automobile. See notes 119-34 & accompanying text
supra, for a discussion of Cady and Oppfeman. Chadwick and Sanders took the interpretation a
step further and found that automobiles had a lesser expectation of privacy than did luggage.
This Note has not contended that a lesser expectation of privacy existed in automobiles
as compared to homes. It has contended, however, that this lesser expectation did not under-
lie the automobile exception. If a lesser expectation of privacy did justify the automobile
exception, however, it does not logically follow that items as transient as footlockers or suit-
cases have any greater expectation of privacy than an automobile. See Arkansas v. Sanders,
442 U.S. at 769 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
161 Sanders did not introduce any new factors. The Court stressed the personal nature of
luggage and emphasized that the expected level of privacy does not decline when luggage is
put inside an automobile. Id at 764-65.
162 101 S. Ct. at 2845; United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 12-13.
163 Traveling salesmen and the mobile vacation home are exceptions to each, respectively.
164 See notes 51-53 & accompanying text supra. This refusal to recognize any distinction
between impersonal and personal effects renders the repository of personal effects factor
meaningless. If the fourth amendment equally protects the dishpan and the diary, then the
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property alike, then the contents of a container or of an automobile
would not affect the level of privacy expected in the container or
automobile.
The plain view factor of Chadwick also does not distinguish
automobiles from luggage. Admittedly, the contents of the passenger
compartment are visible to the public as the automobile travels over the
public thoroughfares, 165 while the contents of luggage are seldom ex-
posed to public scrutiny. 166 Any expectation of privacy existing in the
contents of luggage because of its hidden nature is, however, not differ-
ent from the expectation of privacy in the contents of a glove compart-
ment or a trunk.167 Drivers and occupants of automobiles often put
items in the glove compartment or trunk to secret them from public
view. 168 The Court, however, has not recognized a plain view limit to
warrantless searches under the automobile exception. The Court, pur-
suant to the exception, has upheld the search of the area behind the
back seat cushion,169 the glove compartment, a hidden recess, 170 the
area behind the front seat cushion 17 1 and, in Robbins, the luggage com-
partment of a station wagon.' 72 If the Court recognized plain view as a
rationale for the automobile exception, the Court would logically limit
the exception to the passenger compartment of the automobile. The
officer could only search and seize those items that he could see from
outside of the automobile looking in. 173 In summary, whether the pub-
lic can see the item is irrelevant to the automobile exception. Consis-
tency requires that courts allow officers to open containers found within
the car just as they are allowed to open the glove compartment and the
trunk. The level of privacy expected does not differ.
The final Chadwick factor, which compared state and local regula-
tion of automobiles and luggage, does not reach the expected level of
privacy issue. Simply because states and localities regulate automobile
use and safety conditions, but do not impose similar regulations on lug-
same expectation of privacy can exist in the contents of a suitcase or the trunk of an automo-
bile. For consistency's sake, the Court must either remove the trunk area from the automobile
exception or allow the search of containers within the exception.
165 Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974). See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S.
at 13; South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 368.
166 433 U.S. at 13.
167 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351-52.
168 See Note, Warrantless Searches, supra note 2, at 840-41.
169 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132.
170 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42.
171 Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67.
172 101 S. Ct. at 2844.
t73 For use of the plain view exception to uphold the admissibility of evidence siezed from
an automobile, see Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (officer discovered evidence
during a routine lock-up of an impounded automobile).
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gage, does not indicate that luggage has a higher expected level of pri-
vacy. Traffic ordinances and maintenance requirements do not infringe
on the privacy interest in items within the automobile. Stopping an
automobile for a traffic violation does not trigger a warrantless search of
the automobile under the automobile exception. Neither stopping an
automobile nor arresting the occupants determines whether the automo-
bile exception applies. 174 The exception requires probable cause to be-
lieve the automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime, and an
exigent circumstance.
Based on the factors enunciated in Chadwick and adopted by the
plurality, the expected level of privacy in an automobile is no less than
the privacy expected in a suitcase. By giving the privacy interest in con-
tainers too great a weight, the plurality in Robbins improperly balanced
the privacy interest and the government interest when it concluded that
a warrantless search of the garbage bags was unreasonable.
Furthermore, the justifications underlying an exception not only
determine its reasonableness, but also determine the scope of the permis-
sible intrusion.175 The ultimate question in Robbins is whether the justi-
fications underlying the automobile exception made it reasonable to
open the closed opaque containers without a search warrant.
The need to seize contraband or evidence that might disappear if
an officer first had to obtain a warrant justifies the warrantless search of
the automobile exception. The officer may search the entire automobile
until the suspected item is found. 176 A rule that does not allow officers
to look within containers found during the search will hamper law en-
forcement efforts and increase the intrusion on individual privacy. Not
knowing the contents of any containers found in the car, the officer will
have to make a more thorough search of the car and seize all of the
containers found. Every time an officer stops and searches an automo-
bile under the automobile exception and finds a container that he be-
lieves contains contraband or evidence, he will have to take the
container to a magistrate before opening it. Furthermore, for the seizure
of the containers to be effective, the officer will also have to seize the
occupants of the automobile to ensure that they do not escape while he
obtains a warrant. The safety of the occupants and the need to ensure
against their escape will prevent the officer from performing his other
duties, and will diminish the protection afforded individuals of the area
until he has presented his beliefs to a magistrate. If the magistrate de-
nies the warrant request, the officer would then have to transport the
174 See New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. at 2861-62.
175 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 19.
176 See 101 S. Ct. at 2857 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. at
298-99 (search of entire house).
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occupants back to their car, which would also take him away from his
duties. In an urban area, the trip to the magistrate may be a minor
inconvenience, but in rural areas, the magistrate may preside a consider-
able distance away. 177
Requiring a warrant to search all closed opaque containers does not
offset the negative impact on law enforcement activities by improving
the protection afforded individual privacy. First, safeguards already ex-
ist to protect the individual: automobile stops cannot be random,1 78
and probable cause and exigency are required to justify the automobile
exception. Second, the rule will prove more intrusive because the officer
will have to seize the occupants of the car as well as the container. In a
rural area, this seizure could last for several hours or even days. Finally,
the occupants will have to leave their car unprotected from intruders or
have the car towed at considerable cost to a location close to the nearest
magistrate. Since the warrant requirement does not diminish the intru-
sive nature of the government's action, the Court should have extended
the warrantless search of the automobile exception to aid the officer in
the field and the effectiveness of law enforcement in general.
V. NEW YORK V. BELTON
Roger Belton began his odyssey to the Supreme Court when a New
York state trooper pulled over the automobile in which he was riding for
traveling at excessive speeds. All four occupants remained inside the
automobile as the trooper came to the driver's window and asked to see
the driver's operating license and the car registration. 179 While standing
at the driver's window, the officer thought that he smelled marijuana
smoke and he saw an envelope bearing the inscription "Supergold" on
the floor of the car.180 The trooper then ordered to four occupants out
of the car, arrested them for possession of marijuana, and placed each in
a separate area so that they could not touch. 181 The trooper checked
and found marijuana in the envelope on the automobile's floor,
searched each of the occupants, then searched the interior of the auto-
mobile where he discovered cocaine within a zipped pocket of Belton's
jacket lying on the back seat of the automobile. The trooper took the
jacket and the arrestees to a local police station.
177 See note 79 & accompanying text supra.
178 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 650 (1979).
179 101 S. Ct. at 2861. For New York law authorizing the officer to aks for the licence and
registration, see N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw §§ 401.4 (McKinney Supp. 1980-81) (registration);
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 501 (McKinney 1970) (driver's license).
180 The trooper believed the marking on the envelope indicated a connection with drugs.
101 S. Ct. at 2862.
181 The four were placed apart because the trooper, having only one pair of handcuffs,
decided against restraining only one of the four.
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Belton, who was indicted for the "criminal possession of a con-
trolled substance", 182 moved to suppress the introduction of the cocaine
into evidence, but the trial court denied the motion.' 83 The appellate
court upheld the search and seizure as incident to an arrest, and refused
to find Chadwick controlling.'8 4
The New York Court of Appeals reversed.' 85 The majority failed
to understand how the search of the jacket without a warrant was justi-
fied as incident to an arrest when the jacket was not accessible to the
arrestee at the time of the search.' 86 The dissent challenged the major-
ity's conclusion that the jacket was in the exclusive control of the officer
at the time of search; the dissenters viewed the situation as fluid, and the
search justified.18 7
Justice Stewart's majority opinion' 88 reversed the New York Court
of Appeals.'8 9 The Court held that the search of Belton's jacket was
182 The record does not indicate the basis for Belton's indictment or conviction. For New
York's law on possession of a controlled substance, see N.Y. PUB. HEALTH § 220.03-220.21
(McKinney 1970).
183 After his motion to suppress was denied, Belton pleaded guilty to a lesser offense while
maintaining his right to appeal the seizure of the cocaine.
184 People v. Belton, 68 A.D.2d 198, 416 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1979). The court refused to find
Chadwick controlling. Instead, it relied on three New York state court cases. In People v.
DeSantis, 46 N.Y.2d 82, 385 N.E.2d 577, 412 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1978), the court upheld the
search of a suitcase in the possession of the arrestee when arrested. It concluded that the
search following the arrest was a de minimis intrusion. Id at 87, 385 N.E.2d at 579, 412
N.Y.S.2d at 840. In People v. Cofield, 55 A.D.2d 113, 389 N.Y.S.2d 602 (1976), afd 43
N.Y.2d 654, 371 N.E.2d 535,400 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1977), the court upheld the search of a paper
bag found in a satchel resting on the back seat of an automobile as incident to an arrest. Id
at 115, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 603. Finally, People v. Abramovitz, 58 A.D.2d 921, 396 N.Y.S.2d 729
(1977) upheld as incident to an arrest the search of a leather bag behind the driver's seat. Id
at 922, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 731.
185 50 N.Y.2d 447, 407 N.E.2d 420, 429 N.Y.S.2d 574 (1980).
186 The majority, per Chief Justice Cooke, dismissed the arrest search exception as justifi-
cation for the search because the exception stops short ofjustifying searches of items or areas
not accessible to the arrestee. Id at 449, 407 N.E.2d at 422, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 576. If the
arrestee "is effectively neutralized or the object is with the exclusive control of the police," the
search incident to an arrest exception does not validate the search. Id at 451, 407 N.E.2d at
422, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 576.
187 Justice Gabrielli, in dissent, agreed with the majority that the test was whether the
object searched was within the exclusive control of the officer. He maintained that at the
time the patrolman searched the automobile the situation was still fluid and potentially dan-
gerous: four suspects stood beside the car while the officer ascertained the amount of contra-
band within the automobile. Id at 454, 407 N.E.2d at 424, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 578. Justice
Gabrielli chided the majority for its conclusion that the patrolman was in exclusive control of
the situation simply because the occupants were outside the automobile and the patrolman
had told them they were under arrest. Id at 454-55, 407 N.E.2d at 425, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 579.
188 Justice Stewart wrote for Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and
Rehnquist.
189 The Court granted certiorari to determine the proper scope of a search incident to an
arrest when the arrestee was a recent occupant of the automobile. 101 S. Ct. at 2862.
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valid under the arrest search exception of Chime.19 Justice Stevens con-
curred, finding the search of the container justified under the automo-
bile exception. The dissenters believed that the majority rule was an
unprecedented extension of Chimel.191
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, began his examination of
the issues by referring to Chime! v. Califonia.192 He acknowledged that
Chime limited the scope of a warrantless search contemporaneous with
a valid arrest to the person of the arrestee and the area within the arres-
tee's immediate control.19 3 He noted that although the Chimel rule ap-
peared clear, it was difficult to apply to specific factual situations. This
disturbed him because he believed that, in the realm of fourth amend-
ment analysis, courts should establish clear cut rules. The majority posi-
tion was based on the belief that clear cut rules serve a dual function:
they aid the police in their duties while simultaneously enhancing the
protection of fourth amendment rights. 19 4 Justice Stewart pointed out
that in United States v. Robinson 195 the Court had established a bright line
rule for the search of the person of the arrestee incident to an arrest in
order to clarify any confusion surrounding the scope of the personal
search. 19 6 He noted, however, that the Court had not established such a
clarifying rule defining the scope of the area an officer could search
190 Id at 2865. Justice Stewart noted that since the search of the jacket was permissible
under the arrest search exception, there was no need to consider the automobile exception.
Id at 2865 n.6.
Based on Robbins, if the State of New York had only argued the automobile exception,
the Court probably would have ruled the warrantless search unreasonable.
191 The roots of the dissenters' view can be traced to the dissent in United States v. Robin-
son, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). The dissent there argued that the officer acted unreasonably in
opening the cigarette package rather than seizing it and seeking a warrant. Id at 250-59
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
192 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
193 101 S. Ct. at 2862; Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 762-63.
194 101 S. Ct. at 2863-64. Justice Stewart cited Professor LaFave's conclusion that bright
lines not only aid the police, but they also better protect fourth amendment rights. See
LaFave, "Case by Case Adjuedication" versus "Standardized Procedures'" The Robinson Dilemma, 1974
SuP. CT. REv. 127. "[S]ecurity [as guaranteed by the fourth amendment] can only be real-
ized if the police are acting under a set of rules which, in most instances, makes it possible to
reach a correct determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in
the interest of law enforcement." Id at 142. See also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,
213-14 (1979) (cited by Justice Stewart).
195 414 U.S. 218. An officer suspected Robinson was driving without a license; he stopped
and arrested Robinson after confirming his suspicion. During the pat down search, the officer
seized and opened a crumpled cigarette package. He found contraband inside. id at 220-23.
See Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973) (companion case to Robinson); Draper v.
United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) (police acted reasonably in searching a bag Draper was
carrying when arrested, based on probable cause to believe he was carrying heroin.).
196 414 U.S. at 235. Prior to Robinson, none of the search incident to arrest cases had actu-
ally decided the scope of the search of an arrestee and admissibility of evidence seized, even
though Chimel had recognized the validity of a search of the arrestee contemporaneous with
the arrest. LaFave, supra note 194, at 134.
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when the arrestee was an occupant of an automobile. Because Robinson
had left this question unanswered, and because of the confusion in the
lower courts, Justice Stewart concluded that a bright line rule was
needed.'97 Based on his reading of the lower court decisions, and in
light of the mandate of Chimel, Justice Stewart held that an officer may
search the passenger compartment of an automobile without a warrant
when the officer has contemporaneously arrested a recent occupant of
the automobile. 198
The majority was not content merely to authorize the search of the
interior of the automobile. Instead, they chose to extend the exception
to include any containers found during the search, regardless of the
probability that the container would hold a weapon or evidence. 99 The
Court justified its extension in three steps. First, if the arrestee could
reach the passenger compartment, he could also reach any containers
within the compartment. 200 Second, the Court reasoned that the prior
arrest justified the further intrusion on the arrestee's privacy interests in
the containers. Finally, based on Robinson's allowance of the search of an
arrestee's person regardless of whether the officer had probable cause to
believe the arrestee possessed a weapon or contraband, the Court de-
cided that the officer did not have to determine the probability that a
certain container could hold a weapon or destructible evidence to justify
a warrantless search of it.201 The New York Court of Appeals relied on
Chadwick and Sanders to require a warrant for the search of Belton's jack-
et. Justice Stewart rejected the reliance and pointed out that neither
case involved a search incident to an arrest.20 2
Justice Stevens believed that the Court should have decided Belton
197 "When a person cannot know how a court will apply a settled principle to a recurring
factual situation, that person can not know the scope of his constitutional protection, nor can
a policeman know the scope of his authority." 101 S. Ct. at 2864.
198 Finding that the lower courts had been unable to establish a workable interpretation of
"'the area within the immediate control of the arrestee,"' and concluding that when the
occupant of an automobile is arrested the passenger compartment is within the area of imme-
diate control, the Court held "when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the
occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of the arrest, search the
passenger compartment of that automobile." Id at 2864 (footnotes omitted).
199 The majority defined container as "any object capable of holding another object."
This definition included glove compartments and clothing as well as traditional containers.
Id at 2864 n.4.
200 Appellate courts interpret broadly the area within an arrestee's immediate control and
the arrestee's ability to gain access to and open containers within the area. Ste 2 W. LAFAvE,
supra note 2, at 349.
201 101 S. Ct. at 2864. See also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 763.
202 101 S. Ct. at 2864-65. Justice Stewart took exception with the "fallacious theory" of the
New York court that the trooper, by searching and seizing the jacket, had gained exclusive
control of it. He maintained that the lower court's theory would eliminate the exception. He
reasoned that every time an officer searched an item within an arrestee's immediate area of
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and Robbins the same way203 and, therefore, also concurred204 in revers-
ing the judgment in Belton. He refused to join the majority, however,
because he believed that it established an overbroad constitutional prin-
ciple. 20 5 Justice Stevens maintained that the Court could have reached
the same conclusion if it had applied the automobile exception to the
case and, at the same time, could have avoided subjecting motorists to a
potential additional infringement of their privacy interests. 206 He
pointed out that the automobile exception requires probable cause
before a search may commence. The majority would allow an officer to
search the interior of the automobile whenever he first arrests an occu-
pant, irrespective of the charge and irrespective of whether the officer
had probable cause to search the automobile. He worried that officers
would tend to take a traffic regulation violator into custody in order to
justify the search of the car's passenger area.20 7 Had the court applied
the automobile exception, he concluded, the custodial-noncustodial ar-
rest distinction would be irrelevant.20 8
Justice Brennan 20 9 wrote a scathing dissent. He feared that the ma-
jority's opinion heralded a retreat from the principles promulgated in
control, the act of searching it would remove it from the arrestee's sphere of influence, thereby
eliminating the exigency justifying the warrantless search. Id at 2865 n.5.
The majority in Chadwick recognized that Chimel did not extend to a search that was
temporally or geographically remote from the arrest. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at
14-15. The officers arrested Chadwick over an hour before they searched his footlocker. Fur-
thermore, the arrest occurred at a train station, but the officers searched the footlocker at
their offices. Id at 4. See also Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 763 n. 11.
203 101 S. Ct. at 2865 (Stevens, J., concurring).
204 Id at 2865. Justice Rehnquist also concurred because the Court would not overrule
Mapp and because the Court did not rule on the automobile exception. Id at 2865 (Rehn-
quist, J., concurring).
205 He contended that the Court's reasoning in Beiton would significantly and unnecessa-
rily extend the automobile exception. He believed that the Court did not have to allow the
warrantless searches without probable cause to reach the proper result. 101 S. Ct. at 2859
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens' meaning is not clear. The majority in Beiton pointed out that they did
not reach the automobile exception issue. 101 S. Ct. at 2865, n.6. Possibly the text is incor-
rect and Justice Stevens actually meant to say that Beiton overextended the search incident to
an arrest.
206 He maintained that the officer had probable cause to search the automobile for contra-
band because he smelled marijuana. 101 S. Ct. at 2859. He based his conclusion on the
Robins opinion. Id at 2859 n. 13. In Robbins the plurality accepted the warrantless search of
the automobile under the automobile exception based on a similar fact pattern.
207 The distinction made by the majority between custodial and noncustodial arrests both-
ered Justice Stevens. He feared that officers would begin to make custodial arrests for traffic
regulation violations to obtain the right to search packages within the automobile. Id at
2859. He feared that no constitutional limits existed to control such police behavior. Id at
2858 n.11.
208 Under the automobile exception, the type of arrest or whether there was an arrest is not
relevant. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. at 158-59.
209 He was joined by Justice Marshall.
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Chimd.210 He maintained that it was a fiction to assert that an arrestee
could always gain access to the interior of the automobile and, therefore,
the Court inappropriately extended Chime! to justify the warrantless
search of the area.211 He also argued that the majority's rule was con-
trary to fundamental fourth amendment principles dealing with excep-
tions to the warrant requirement.2 12 He accused the majority of
refusing to limit the scope of the search to its initial justification213 and
failing to look to the facts to determine whether to grant the excep-
tion.214 He asserted that the majority's approach had no rational stop-
ping point.2 15
Justice Brennan castigated the majority for departing from Chimel
and fourth amendment principles merely for the sake of convenience
and clarity. He vigorously asserted that the rule proclaimed would not
210 101 S. Ct. at 2866 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "The Court today turns its back on the
product of that analysis, formulating an arbitrary 'bright line' rule applicable to 'recent' oc-
cupants of automobiles that fails to reflect Chimd's underlying policy justifications." Id
211 Relying extensively on the New York Court of Appeals' rendition of the situation, he
accepted the court's view that because the occupants were standing outside the automobile
and were under arrest, the contents of the interior of the car were not within the arrestees'
immediate area of control. Since he concluded that Chimel's rationale did not apply, he ar-
gued that the majority had carved out a dangerous precedent in approving the warrantless
search. Id at 2868 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
212 Specifically, he believed that the Court ignored "a fundamental principal of Fourth
Amendment analysis that exceptions to the warrant requirement are to be narrowly con-
strued." Id at 2866. He cited Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 759-60; Mincey v. Arizona,
437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 454-55; Vale v. Louisi-
ana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 357; Jones v. United States,
357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
213 "[Flor a search to be valid under the Fourth Amendment, it must be '"strictly tied to
and justified by" the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.'" 101 S. Ct. at
2866 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 19 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 310)).
214 "[C]ourts should carefully consider the facts and circumstances of each search and
seizure, focusing on the reasons supporting the exception rather than on any bright line rule
of general application." 101 S. Ct. at 1866 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
215 He argued that under the Court's rationale the police could search an automobile inte-
rior even if the arrestee were handcuffed and in the police car. Id at 2868. He maintained
that this outcome was "analytically unsound and inconsistent with every significant search
incident to arrest case" decided by the Court. Id
Only in Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. at 35, was the search contemporaneous with the
arrest. The Court held the warrantless search of Vale's home impermissible after officers
arrested him on its porch steps. Se Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818 (1969) (per curiam).
In all the other cases cited by Justice Brennan, the search was not contemporaneous with
the arrest. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 14 (one-and-one-half hours later); Coo-
lidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 456-57 (two days later); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S.
at 47 (after towed to station house and arrestees in custody); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Co.,
391 U.S. 216, 220 (1968) (after car towed to station house); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S.
364, 368 (1964) (after automobile towed to a garage).
The Court in Chimd made the same point. "No consideration relevant to the Fourth
Amendment suggests any point of rational limitation, once the search is allowed to go beyond
the area from which the person arrested might obtain weapons or evidentiary items." Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. at 766 (footnote omitted).
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be any more convenient or clear because it left many questions unan-
swered.216 Justice Brennan predicted that law enforcement officers and
the courts would find it more difficult to answer the questions because
the Court failed to provide any guiding rationale to replace the aban-
doned rationale of Chimel.217 He concluded that the rule announced
would hamper rather than aid effective law enforcement. Although he
recognized that Chimel was sometimes difficult to apply, he urged the
Court not to abandon it because certain guidelines did exist to aid in its
application 218 and because it was faithful to the fourth amendment.
In a short dissent, Justice White219 argued that the Court had acted
rashly in establishing a rule that would allow officers to search contain-
ers in the absence of probable cause. He believed that this was a radical
extension of Chimel, and noted that even if Robbins had upheld the
search of the packages, the officers still would have needed probable
cause to validate the search.220
VI. THE CHIMEL DOCTRINE
Belton presented the Court with two issues, both involving the scope
of a search incident to an arrest. The Court extended the exception to
include the passenger compartment of an automobile, and further ex-
216 101 S. Ct. at 2869 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The questions relating to the search of the
automobile include: how soon must the arrest occur after the person has left the automobile;
how close to the car must the arrestee be when the car is searched; when did the police have to
develop probable cause; and what is included within the interior of the car. Id
217 Although he agreed with the majority that in routine cases the trunk-interior demarca-
tion would work, he believed that the rule espoused would only serve to create additional
problems in the more difficult cases. He argued that the Court had abandoned the principles
of Chimel and therefore had given the police and lower courts a rule without an underlying
rationale. Id
218 In determining the relevant scope of a search incident to an arrest, Justice Brennan
urged courts to consider the number of arrestees and officers involved, whether the arrestees
were restrained and in what manner, and "the ability of the arrestee to gain access to a
particular area or container." Id at 2870.
The last factor cited by Justice Brennan is conclusory and adds nothing to the analysis.
For a discussion of factors to determine whether a search is valid as incidental to an arrest, see
2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 2, at 502-06.
Justice Brennan also lashed out at the majority for creating a straw man based on its
interpretation of the New York Court of Appeals' "exclusive control" theory. He reminded
the Court that Chadwick decided that exclusive control meant more than merely holding an
item in one's hand. It meant that there was not a "significant risk" that the arrestee could
gain access to the item. 101 S. Ct. at 2870 n.5.
He broadened the language of Chadwick. The majority in Chadwick recognized exclusive
control when no danger existed that the arrestee would gain access to the object or area,
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 14-15. They did not, contrary to Justice Brennan's
indication, recognize it when an insignificant risk still remained.
219 He was joined by Justice Marshall.
220 101 S. Ct. at 2870 (White, J., dissenting). He maintained that the Court should have
exercised more caution in extending warrantless searches not based on probable cause.
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tended it to any containers found within the passenger areas whenever
an officer contemporaneously arrests a recent occupant of the automo-
bile. Although the majority was correct in concluding that the warrant-
less search was reasonable in this case, no precedent required the
majority to find all such searches reasonable.
The scope of a search incident to an arrest has had a volatile his-
tory.221 The Court changed direction for the last time in Chirae/, which
overruled 222 United States v. Rabinowit 223 and Harris v. United States.224
The Court in Chimel chose to narrow the search justified by a prior,
contemporaneous arrest. Rather than continuing to uphold searches of
areas over which the arrestee had possessory control, such as an entire
apartment225 or an entire room, 226 the Court chose to limit the search to
the area within the arrestee's immediate control.227
221 The Court first recognized the search incident to an arrest exception in dictum in
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). A little over ten years later, the Court
extended the right to include a search of the place where the arrest occurred. Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925) (dictum); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 198-99
(1927). The Court then limited the exception by requiring officers to obtain warrants when
they had the opportunity and the necessary information to do so. Go-Bart Importing Co. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 344, 356-58 (1931); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464-66
(1932). Hari reversed the limiting trend: it reiterated the Agnel-o dictum and Maron hold-
ing. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150-51 (1947). A year later, however, the Court
jumped back to Co-Bart and Le/kowiiz in Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), in
which the Court invalidated a warrantless search because the officers could have obtained a
warrant. Id at 705, 708. Within two years the Court had returned to Harri. United States
v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63-66 (1950). Harris and Rabinowitz were the law until Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752.
In the first thirty-five years of the exception the Court narrowed or expanded it four
times. Chimde was the fifth change in doctrine by the Court. 395 U.S. at 770 (White, J.,
dissenting). For a synopsis of the history of the arrest search exception, see id at 755-60.
The Chimel change should not have come as a total surprise. Five years before the Chime?
decision the Court analyzed another search incident to an arrest situation and elucidated the
very principles that would make Chine famous. See Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364
(1964). Police, upon making an arrest, could "make a contemporaneous search of the person
of the accused for weapons or for the fruits of or implements used to commit the crime."
They could search "things under the accused's immediate control, [and] depending on the
circumstances, . . . the place where he is arrested." Id at 367.
222 395 U.S. at 768. The police, with an arrest warrant for Chimel, went to his home and
waited for him to return from work. When Chimel arrived the officers arrested him and
searched his entire home. Id at 753-54.
223 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
224 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
225 331 U.S. at 148-49. Officers arrested Harris pursuant to an arrest warrant as he sat in
his living room. Documents used to convict him were found within a sealed envelope in a
desk drawer.
226 339 U.S. at 58-59. Officers arrested Rabinowitz pursuant to an arrest warrant in his
one-room office. Officers seized forged documents during a ninety minute search of his desk,
file cabinets and safe.
227 395 U.S. 752, 763. The Court construed "that phrase to mean the area from within
which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." Id at 763. The Court
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As the majority in Belton indicated, the courts often have had diffi-
culty determining the permissible area of the search. 228 Police officers
also have had difficulty ascertaining the proper scope of a search inci-
dent to an arrest when faced with split-second judgments based on the
facts of a particular situation.229 To clarify the confusion, the Court
handed down its bright line rule as an extension of Chimel. The officer
would no longer have to decide whether the arrestee could reach into
the automobile to grab a weapon or evidence before searching the auto-
mobile. After Belton, if the arrestee was a recent occupant, the officer
could search the passenger compartment of the automobile without a
warrant.
The dissent correctly accused the majority of ignoring the Chime!
rationale. Chimel required an analysis of the facts and circumstances
facing the officer to determine the permissible scope of the search inci-
dent to the arrest. 230 Chimel refused to allow the search of the home of
the arrestee or even the room in which the arrestee was arrested. The
majority in Be/ton failed to analyze the total situation and, instead, fo-
cused solely on the fact that Belton had just recently departed from the
automobile prior to his arrest. As Justice Brennan indicated, the major-
ity's analysis failed to include the Chime! tests of whether the area was
still accessible to Belton or whether the officer had exclusive control of
the area searched. If the officer had exclusive control of the area, or
Belton did not have access to the area, the officer would need a warrant
to search the area.
The Court cited United States v. Robison as precedent for its bright
line rule. Reliance on Robinson, however, was also misplaced. The Court
in Robison upheld the right to search the person of the arrestee regard-
less of whether the officer had reason to believe that a weapon or evi-
dence would be found.231 The corollary to the rule espoused in Robinson
has not ruled on whether the destructibility of the evidence is crucial to the immediate war-
rantless seizure.
228 See text accompanying note 196 supra.
229 Although the Court has presumed that the officer will seek a warrant when he is not
sure whether the scope of the intended search is permissible, human nature indicates an oppo-
site result. In a tension-filled arrest situation, it is more realistic to conclude that the officer
will attempt to stretch the boundaries of the exception to their limits. The sense of self preser-
vation surely preempts the vague nuances of the fourth amendment. See Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. at 182 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Traffic stops are particularly dangerous for the police. In 1979, 6,329 officers were as-
saulted during routine traffic stops. Brief for Petitioner, New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. 2860
(1981), at 14 n.16 (citing CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 1975-79.). From 1975 through
1979, eighty-two officers were murdered during traffic stops. Id at 14 n.6 (citing 1975-80,
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, LAw EN-
FORCEMENT OFFICERS KILLED 1975-1980).
230 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 765; United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 63.
231 See note 195 & accompanying text supra.
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is that the police may search the area within the arrestee's control irre-
spective of whether the police have probable cause to believe a weapon
or evidence is located within the area. Robinson does not support a rule
that defines, for a general category of cases, the area of a permissible
search incident to an arrest. Belton, without precedent, decided that
whenever an officer arrests a recent occupant of an automobile, the pas-
senger compartment is included within the area the officer may search
without a warrant.
The Belton Court maintained that a clear cut rule would aid law
enforcement efforts because officers would not have to consider the spe-
cific facts of each situation in determining whether they could search the
interior of the automobile. The rule announced in Belton, however, is
limited to the facts of the Belton case because the court failed to provide
any useful rationale232 for applying it to cases whose facts vary from
Belton. The location of the arrestee when arrested is the crucial issue in
determining whether the area searched incident to an arrest was reason-
able.233 The Belton rule only provides guidance on this issue when the
officer removes an occupant from his automobile and arrests him. If the
occupant is already outside of his vehicle when the officer approachs
him and an arrest occurs, Belton's bright line rule does not provide any
guidance. The officer must evaluate the particular facts of the situation
to determine whether he can search the automobile without a warrant.
Courts must guard against officers directing occupants to return to their
automobiles as a pretext for justifying a warrantless search of the auto-
mobile under Belton.
Although the Court did establish a bright line rule which was con-
trary to Chimel and unsupported by Robinson, the Court was correct in
finding the warrantless search of Belton's jacket reasonable. An officer
may search without a warrant an area incident to an arrest if the area
was within the arrestee's immediate control and if the officer does not
have exclusive control of the area prior to the search. 234 Justice Bren-
nan argued, and the New York Court of Appeals held, that the trooper
in Belton had the situation under control and had secured the interior of
the automobile from intrusion by one or more of the arrestees. They
reached this conclusion because the trooper, before searching the inte-
rior of the automobile, had ordered the occupants from the car and told
them they were under arrest. They believed that this showed that the
232 101 S. Ct. at 2869 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
233 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 763.
234 The search incident to an arrest exception does not cover searches that are remote in
time or place from the arrest nor in circumstances where the officers have exclusive control of
the area or object searched. Set United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15; Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 456-57; Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964).
1981] 1215
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
trooper had control of the situation and, therefore, he had to obtain a
warrant before searching the car. The facts of Belton do not support this
conclusion. A lone trooper stopped a speeding automobile which none
of the occupants owned. He eventually ordered the occupants out of the
car and placed them under arrest for a drug offense. Having only one
pair of handcuffs, the officer could not restrain all four of the occupants,
so he placed them around the automobile. Considering the proximity of
the arrestees to the car, the fact that none were restrained, and that the
occupants outnumbered the officer four to one, the officer's verbal com-
mands do not indicate that he had total control of the situation. The
search incident to an arrest exception was recognized in order to protect
the safety of the officer and to guard against the destruction of evi-
dence.2 35 It is unreasonable to require an officer confronted by several
unrestrained arrestees to assume their willingness to obey his commands
until they act in a contrary manner.2 36
Once the threshold issue of the scope of the search is determined in
favor of allowing the search of the interior of the automobile, the further
warrantless search of the containers found there follows. Chimel allowed
the opening of "desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas" within
the area of the arrestee's reach.23 7 The Court gave no indication that
containers are not included Within the definition of closed or concealed
areas. Similarly, Robinson allowed the officer to open a crumpled ciga-
rette package found on the arrestee.23 8 Once the arrest has occurred, the
officer may contemporaneously search the arrestee and the area within
his immediate control, opening anything found in the course of the
search. The officer, therefore, acted properly in searching the pockets of
the jacket since the jacket was within Belton's immediate area of
control.
VII. CONCLUSION
Fourth amendment litigation consumes a disproportionate share of
the Supreme Court's time.2 39 This incessant litigation has confused law
235 If the officer cannot search for weapons, the arrestee might use any available weapons
"to resist arrest or effect his escape. . . . [T]he officer's safety might well be endangered, and
the arrest itself frustrated." Similarly, the officer can search and seize evidence "to prevent its
concealment or destruction." 395 U.S. at 763.
236 The officer had already arrested them because he had probable cause to believe they
had broken a law. A pat down is a seizure under Teny analysis. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
at 16.
237 395 U.S. at 763.
238 See note 194 & accompanying text supra.
239 "The Amendment. . . continues to spawn a seemingly endless stream of litigation; as
some issues are finally put to rest, still others surface and cry out for resolution." LaFave,
supra note 192, at 127.
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officers and the courts, and has led commentators to call for clear cut
rules.240 The Court in Robbins and in Belton apparently listened to this
call and strove to obtain clarity and consistency in the analysis of auto-
mobile search and container search issues. Both decisions announced
bright line rules that their adherents on the Court believed would pro-
vide form to fourth amendment analysis. It is unlikely that they suc-
ceeded; the dissenters in both cases foretold of new issues to which the
focus of fourth amendment litigation would shift.24 1
The decisions in Robbins and Belton did clarify some fourth amend-
ment issues. Even though the plurality mistakenly considered Robbins as
a container case instead of an automobile exception case, it did clarify
when an officer had to obtain a warrant to search a container. Simi-
larly, in Belton the Court clarified the scope of an arrest-incident search
on the facts presented. Furthermore, the decision made clear that when-
ever the Court in the future finds that a container was within the imme-
diate area of control of the arrestee, regardless of the nature of the
container, an officer may search it without a warrant. These questions
were unsettled prior to this term.
Although the Court indicated that it desired to write on a clean
slate of fourth amendment jurisprudence, the decisions are, on close in-
spection, disappointing. The philosophical direction of the Court and
the precedential value of these cases are unclear. Two facts contribute
to this philosophical confusion and precedential uncertainty.
240 Professor LaFave has reiterated many times his call for clear guidelines for the police.
"Even if the result ultimately reached would not be satisfying to a logician, one would hope
• . . that the Court would 'adopt a clearcut rule' so that the police would know how to
proceed as to a situation with which they are regularly confronted." 2 W. LAFAVE, sufra note
2, at 541 (footnote omitted). In one of the most commonly cited statements by Professor
LaFave on the need for clear cut rules, he said:
My basic premise is that Fourth Amendment doctrine, given force and effect by the
exclusionary rule, is primarily intended to regulate the police in their day-to-day activi-
ties and thus ought to be expressed in terms that are readily applicable by the police in
the context of the law enforcement activities in which they are necessarily engaged. A
highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring
the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions, may be the sort of heady stuff
upon which the facile minds of lawyers and judges easily feed, but they may be 'literarily
impossible of application by the officer in the field.'
LaFave, supra note 194, at 141 (footnotes omitted).
Three of the four parties in Robbins and Belon urged the Court to clarify the law or
establish bright line rules. Robbins argued that the warrant requirement absent exigent cir-
cumstances was sufficient. Brief for Petitioner, Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981),
at 41-42. The State of California urged the Court to make clear what containers came within
the protection of the fourth amendment. Brief for Respondent, Robbins v. California, 101 S.
Ct. 2841 (1981), at 47-48. Similarly, the State of New York asked the Court to establish
factors to consider in determining the appropriate scope of a search incident to an arrest.
Brief for Petitioner, New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981), at 18.
241 101 S. Ct. at 2850 (Powell, J., concurring); id at 2850 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); 101 S.
Ct. at 2869 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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First, the cases were factually similar. Both Robbins and Belton
first came under police scrutiny when the automobiles in which they
rode were validly stopped for a traffic infraction. The officers in each
situation developed probable cause during the stop to arrest Robbins
and Belton for drug related offenses. After the arrest, the officers
searched an area of each automobile and found contraband. The only
factual difference2 42 was that the evidence seized in Robbins was found in
the luggage area, whereas the evidence seized in Belton was found in the
passenger compartment; the court did not rule on the basis of this
distinction.
Second, a majority of the Court could not agree on a uniform ap-
proach to the cases. A majority of the justices, however, were consistent
in their approach to the cases. Three justices consistently began their
analysis with a presumption in favor of the warrant clause and required
a warrant in each case.2 43 Three other justices took a reasonableness
approach in analyzing the warrantless searches and found them valid in
each case. 244
The trilateral split on the Court resulted in it deciding two factu-
ally similar cases differently because it emphasized a different fourth
amendment clause in analyzing the automobile exception in Robbins and
the search incident to an arrest exception in Belton. This inconsistency
does not indicate to lower courts or to police officers the philosophical
direction of the Court. Robbins and Belton leave open the question
whether the Court will continue to adhere to the warrant requirement
or whether it will look to the reasonableness of the search in the future.
The fourth amendment was designed to safeguard individual pri-
vacy rights from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Robbins and
Belton decisions placed the court in the awkward position of having nar-
rowed the warrant exception that requires the most justification for an
intrusion of one's privacy interests, and having extended the warrant
exception that does not require probable cause for an intrusion. Be-
cause the Court's prior decisions did not mandate the narrowing of the
242 Both Justice Powell, 101 S. Ct. at 2848 n.2, and Justice Stevens, id at 2855, mentioned
the similarity. Justice Powell, however, did not view the factual similarity as bearing on the
results of the cases. Justice Stevens, on the other hand, viewed the similarity as an indication
that the Court should have reached the same result in each case.
243 Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White. The position taken by the three justices is
consistent with contemporary fourth amendment analysis: a search pursuant to a valid war-
rant is reasonable per se while a warrantless search's reasonableness must be determined by
the facts and circumstances of the situation. When they found that the warrant requirement
applied to the search in Robbins, albeit incorrectly, they did not have to look to the facts. The
warrantless search was per se unreasonable. Consistent with contemporary fourth amend-
ment analysis, the justices attacked the majority in Belton for failing to consider the facts and
circumstances in extending the search incident to an arrest exception.
244 Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stevens.
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automobile exception or the extension of the search incident exception,
law enforcement personnel must wonder whether the decisions represent
anything more than form over substance.
There is one explanation for why the Court was more willing to
expand the search incident to an arrest exception than the automobile
exception. Theoretically, the Court determines the reasonableness of
any search or seizure by balancing the societal interest in the intrusion
against the individual's privacy interest. 245 Fourth amendment analysis
currently presumes reasonableness when an officer obtains a warrant,
and unreasonableness when he fails to obtain a warrant.246 The pre-
sumptions are cast aside, however, when a recognized exception to the
warrant clause is present. The Court finds an exception reasonable
based upon its underlying rationale. The rationale justifies the search
and also limits the scope of the search. 247 Both the automobile excep-
tion and the search incident to an arrest exception promote the societal
concern of preserving evidence. The arrest search exception, however, is
also concerned with the safety of the officer. Since the underlying ra-
tionale of the search incident to an arrest exception is broader than the
automobile exception rationale, the former justifies a broader search.
Just as the philosophical direction of the court is unclear, the prece-
dential value of Robbins is uncertain because, after Justice Stewart's re-
tirement, only three members of the plurality who supported the bright
line rule remain on the Court. Justice Powell, who voted with the plu-
245 The exceptions evolve from the belief that in certain instances it is more reasonable for
an officer to conduct a search without a warrant than to require the officer to first obtain a
warrant from a neutral magistrate. The reasonableness of any particular search or seizure is
determined by balancing the conflicting interests: "[T]here can be 'no ready test for deter-
mining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the inva-
sion which the search [or seizure] entails.'" Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 536-37
(brackets in original).
Although Camara is often cited as initiating the balancing approach to fourth amend-
ment rights, Justice Jackson discussed balancing as early as in theJohnson case. "There are
exceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the need for effective law enforcement
against the right of privacy, it may be contended that a magistrate's warrant for search may
be dispensed with." Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. at 14-15. See also Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. at 149.
More recently, the Court reaffirmed the balancing approach in dictum in Sanders.
"[T]he societal costs of obtaining a warrant, such as danger to officers or the risk of loss or
destruction of evidence, outweigh the reasons for prior recourse to a neutral magistrate."
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 759 (footnotes omitted). See W. LAFAVE, .upra note 2, at
836.
Some decisions have mentioned a third factor in the balancing scheme: the efficacy of
the intrusion. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. at 50-51; Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654;
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878-81.
246 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 454-55; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at
357.
247 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. at 61 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 19.
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rality, indicated in his concurrence that the Robbins decision had not
settled the issue of the scope of the automobile exception. He indicated
his willingness to accept the bright line rule advocated by the dissenters
and to extend the automobile exception search to include all containers
found during the search.2 48 After Robbins it remains for the Court to
create a consensus concerning the scope of the automobile exception.
The precedential value of the rule announced in Belton is also of
questionable status. Of the six justices who voted to uphold the war-
rantless search of Belton's jacket, Justice Stewart has retired, Justice
Rehnquist voted based on what the majority did not do, and Justice
Stevens upheld the warrantless search on other grounds. Furthermore,
upon close inspection, the rule announced appears limited to the factual
context of the case. If the arrestee is not a recent occupant of an auto-
mobile stopped on a public thoroughfare, the Court must revert back to
the principles of Chimel to decide the reasonableness of each search or
announce additional bright line rules.
The philosophical divergence and the questionable guidance pro-
vided by the Court are not new in this area of the law.249 The Court's
willingness to abandon the customary case-by-case approach to analyz-
ing fourth amendment issues is unprecedented. The decision in both
cases established general categories of rights or authority under the
fourth amendment and chose to ignore the facts and circumstances of
future cases. Robbins established that an expectation of privacy exists in
all closed opaque containers and mandated that a warrant be obtained
before searching them. Belton defined the area of a search incident to an
arrest to always include the passenger compartment of an automobile
upon the arrest of a recent occupant.
Between the two opinions, all nine justices favored a bright line rule
that would deal with a general category of case types rather than look to
the facts of each individual case. Since a bright line rule was adopted
248 "Some future case affording an opportunity for more thorough consideration of the
basic principles at risk may offer some better, if more radical solution to the confusion that
infects this behighted area of the law." 101 S. Ct. at 2851 (Powell, J., concurring).
249 Confusion existed in this area of the law even before the container cases of Chadwick
and Sanders. The Court has, from time to time, noted its own inconsistency within the fourth
amendment realm. "The decisions of the Court over the years point in differing directions
and differ in emphasis. No trick of logic will make them all perfectly consistent." Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 483. The Court has also noted that the law concerning the
warrantless search of vehicles is "less than a seamless webb." Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S.
at 440; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 490 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Commentators, too, have commented on the confused state of the law pertaining to vehi-
cles and searches. "The several decisions of the Court on this subject can not be reconciled,
and in recent years the Court had often been unable to muster a majority position on the
issue. It is no exaggeration, therefore, to say that these decisions constitute a 'labyrinth of
judicial uncertainty'. . . ." 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 2, at 111.
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that increased the warrant requirement and another was adopted that
extended a warrant exception, it is impossible to know what trend, if
any, these cases indicate. It is obvious that the justices are willing to
experiment with this general factual approach when it furthers their
fourth amendment analysis.
The legacy of these cases is confusion. Rather than erasing the slate
to provide clear guidelines to law officers and the courts, the Court chose
to smudge the writing already on the slate and then to write over it with
bright line rules that provide no clarity.
JEFFREY A. CARTER
